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ABSTRACT 
 In 2005, after a two-decade war, South Sudan signed a Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement that led to independence from the Republic of Sudan in 2011. However, in 
December 2013, the country sank into another civil war when troops loyal to President 
Salva Kiir clashed with those loyal to the dismissed vice president, Dr. Riek Machar. The 
reasons for the outbreak of the civil war include but are not limited to a weak and divided 
governing party (the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement or SPLM), an unprofessional 
military force (the Sudan People’s Liberation Army or SPLA), a fragile economy, and 
ethnic divisions. The civil war continues despite the intervention and mediation of the 
eight-member Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) as well as the 
international community. Earlier negotiations led to a pair of accords: 1) the Agreement 
on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan 2015 (ARCSS 2015) and 2) the 
Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan 2018 (R-ARCSS 
2018). This thesis examines the role of the political and security elite in the failure of the 
two agreements. It argues that the political and security elite exploited the weakness in 
both agreements—such as failure to include all stakeholders—and undermined 
implementation of the disarmament and demobilization of rival militias. Moreover, the 
intervention of the regional powers, including Sudan and Uganda, exacerbated competing 
interests of instrumental elites. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
As part of the solution to end the two-decade civil war in Sudan, the July 20, 2002 
Machakos protocol provided for self-determination of South Sudan.1 This protocol later 
became part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that was signed in 2005. A 
referendum was held five years after signing of the CPA and the people of South Sudan 
voted for secession from Sudan, and South Sudan became an independent country in 2011. 
The new country, however, did not make good use of the peace after the war with Sudan; 
a civil war broke out in December 2013 and it is still going on today. Two peace 
agreementsthat is, the August 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South 
Sudan (ARCSS) and the September 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the 
Conflict in South Sudan (R-ACSS)—have been signed to end the war but were violated 
within hours of signing.  
The civil war in South Sudan, which started in 2013, has caused unimaginable 
suffering to the people of South Sudan; 383,000 people are estimated to have been killed 
while four million have either been internally displaced or fled to the neighboring 
countries,2 almost making the country a failed state. Øystein H. Rolandsen notes “the gap 
between the warring factions continues to widen: attacks and atrocities are reported as 
ethnically motivated and thereby perpetuating revenge attacks and maintaining an 
environment of distrust and mutual suspicion.”3 During times like this, the ordinary people 
often look to their leaders—in particular, the political and security elitefor guidance and 
solutions. Unfortunately, the political and security elite have not been helpful in finding a 
                                                 
1 Øystein H. Rolandsen, “A Quick Fix? A Retrospective Analysis of the Sudan Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement,” Review of African Political Economy 38, no. 130 (December 2011): 551–64, https://doi.org/
10.1080/03056244.2011.630869. 
2 “Civil War in South Sudan,” Global Conflict Tracker, accessed March 6, 2019, https://cfr.org/
interactive/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan. 
3 Øystein H. Rolandsen, “Another Civil War in South Sudan: The Failure of Guerrilla Government?,” 
Journal of Eastern African Studies 9, no. 1 (January 2, 2015): 164 https://doi.org/10.1080/
17531055.2014.993210. 
2 
solution to the civil war in South Sudan. United Nations (UN) Secretary General Antonio 
Guterres expressed his disappointment about the elite of South Sudan saying he had “never 
seen a political elite with so little interest in the well-being of its own people.”4 
Consequently, the situation in South Sudan shapes the major question of this research, what 
is the role of the security and political elite in the continued violation of the peace 
agreements?  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The research examines why South Sudan peace agreements of the current civil war 
have been violated despite the suffering the people of South Sudan are facing. The people 
of South Sudan have faced conflict for the last four decades, which involves three civil 
wars: the 1956–72 civil war, settled by the 1972 Addis Ababa peace agreement; the 1983–
2005 civil war was settled by the CPA, which led to the birth of South Sudan; and the 
current civil war, which began in 2013. The civil wars have brought unimaginable suffering 
to the people of South Sudan. Death, internal displacement of people, and a diaspora of 
Sudanese refugees to other countries are characteristics of the conflict. Although Matthew 
LeRiche and Matthew Arnold note that the 1983–2005 civil war caused two million deaths, 
four million internally displaced persons, and 800,000 refugees,5 the current civil war 
might exceed those numbers given the current estimates.  
The 1983–2005 civil war led to South Sudan gaining independence on July 9, 2011, 
as a result of the CPA of 2005. The Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement (SPLM) was the 
government in power following the CPA, and it absorbed the various factions that had 
fought the Khartoum government during the second civil war of 1983–2005. The new state 
of the Republic of South Sudan was to defend and protect its citizens from both internal 
and external aggression, develop the country’s infrastructure, and improve on delivery of 
                                                 
4 Luka Biong Kuol, Sarah Logan, and Paul Collier, The Struggle for South Sudan: Challenges of 
Security and State Formation (London, New York: I. B. Tauris, 2019), 5. 
5 Matthew LeRiche, and Matthew Arnold, South Sudan: From Revolution to Independence (Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
3 
services, which the southerners claimed was denied to them before independence plunged 
them into a civil war. 
Two peace agreements—that is, the August 2015 ARCSS and the September 2018 
R-ARCSS – were signed to end the war but were violated hours after signing. As Virginia 
Fortna observes, “maintaining peace after war requires cooperation.”6 This cooperation 
must begin with the elite. Yet, cooperation is not happening in South Sudan, as it starts and 
ends at the signing of agreements. The thesis analyzes how and why the security and 
political elite have contributed to the failed cooperation, leading to renewed fighting 
whenever a peace agreement is signed. Understanding how and why the political and 
security elite contribute to the failure of peace in South Sudan will contribute to the 
available literature about the civil war’s dynamics and how peace can be brought to the 
country. In addition, it will help future policy makers in understanding and solving conflicts 
of the same nature as that of South Sudan. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is a lot of literature concerning the durability of peace agreements in the face 
of conflict. This literature review focuses on what various scholars have written about the 
factors that affect the durability of peace agreements. Focus is put on the negotiations, the 
content of accords, and external or international factor. Fortna sometimes views 
agreements as “scraps of paper,” as do realists in international relations who believe that 
peace accords and their content are at “best epiphenomenal.”7 That is, “agreements may 
reflect factors that affect durability, but arguments that they themselves shape the chances 
for lasting peace are idealistic.”8 
                                                 
6 Virginia Page Fortna, Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018), 10. 
7 Virginia Page Fortna, “Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace,” International 
Organization 57, no. 2 (2003): 338. 
8 Fortna. 
4 
1. Peace Agreement Negotiation 
Literature shows that peace negotiations are a critical factor to peace agreement 
implementation and durability. John Darby and Roger MacGinty note that certain 
conditions are necessary during peace negotiations for a peace agreement to hold: total 
inclusivity, trust and faithfulness, and handling the causes of the conflict.9 Even in the 
presence of these conditions, however, the elite have a role to play for the success of the 
peace agreement. 
The protagonists’ willingness to negotiate in good faith is important for successful 
peace negotiations. Jack Kalpakian addresses the faithfulness of the belligerents during the 
negotiations. Faithfulness in this case refers to the degree of trust and whether the 
negotiating parties believe in the negotiations. Faithfulness is sometimes dependent on the 
history of the belligerents and the conflict.10 It is difficult for people who have been 
fighting each other to simply sit down and trust each other, but without faith, negotiations 
may fail. During such times the elite play a leading role in creating an environment of trust. 
Third parties can also play a leading role at this stage, especially by linking the elite of both 
sides of the conflict to eliminate issues that cause the mistrust. Darby and MacGinty claim 
that, “the chances of collapse in the early stages are high and are increased by the distrust, 
secrecy and involvement of third parties that characterize initial exchanges. Parties may 
offer or demand signals of good faith.”11 However this claim  arguably undervalues the 
third parties’ role, since it is often the third parties that link up the elites of the warring 
factions. 
During the process of peace negotiations, it is important to bring onboard various 
stakeholders directly in the conflict, including political and military (especially armed non-
                                                 
9 John Darby and Roger MacGinty, eds., Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Peace Processes and 
Post-War Reconstruction, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 3–6. 
10 Jack Vahram Kalpakian, “Peace Agreements in a Near-Permanent Civil War: Learning from Sudan 
and South Sudan,” South African Journal of International Affairs 24, no. 1 (January 2, 2017): 1–19, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2017.1311280. 
11 Darby and MacGinty, 7. 
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state actors), civil society, and the regional countries.12 Leaving out some groups can lead 
to spoilers of the negotiated peace agreement. Spoilers are parties or individuals who 
violate the peace accords, perhaps because their issues were not addressed properly, or for 
some, the driving factor might be economical, especially if they gain economically from 
the continuation of war through the sale of arms and other merchandise. The UN Guidance 
for Effective Mediation advocates bringing everyone on board as inclusivity results in 
ownership and legitimacy of the agreement, making it easier to implement as well as 
decreasing the chances of those excluded derailing the process.13 Thus, the inclusivity of 
all stakeholders brings all issues into account in peace negotiations and eventually the 
peace accord.  
Negotiations should address the central issues of the conflict. Since most conflicts 
have different causes, for instance ethnic conflicts and dictatorship of a government in 
power, it is important to look at the causes of a particular conflict and the different 
stakeholders in order to have lasting peace.14 Regarding bringing all stakeholders on board, 
Darby and MacGinty argue that “some peace processes are largely creatures of the 
international community. They reflect the desired outcome of key stakeholders in the 
international community rather than the wishes of the local communities. They are products 
of planning in the western capitals rather than the results of local decisions.”15 Thus, peace 
agreements from such a peace process cannot be durable as they address issues of the 
international community but not the real affected people. Minority groups need assurances 
and guarantees in order to avoid the continuation of the conflict as they can turn out to be 
spoilers. Changes in the causes of the conflict might arise as negotiations proceed as a 
                                                 
12 Claudia Hofmann and Ulrich Schneckener, “Engaging Non-State Armed Actors in State- and 
Peace-Building: Options and Strategies,” International Review of the Red Cross 93, no. 883 (September 
2011): 603–21, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383112000148. 
13 United Nations, “Guidance for Effective Mediation,” UN Peacemaker, June 2012, 
https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/
GuidanceEffectiveMediation_UNDPA2012%28english%29_0.pdf. 
14 Fernand de Varennes, “Peace Accords and Ethnic Conflicts: A Comparative Analysis of Content 
and Approaches,” in Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes, eds. John 
Darby and Roger MacGinty (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2003), 151–60, https://doi.org/10.1057/
9781403918475_14. 
15 Darby and MacGinty, Contemporary Peacemaking, 4. 
6 
result of the intra-warring faction dynamics. When changes occur or situations change, this 
is usually the time the elite play a leading role by aligning their parties and the mediators 
to the changes in order for the peace negotiations to stay on track.  
Timing or ripeness of the conflict is also an important factor when considering 
peace agreement negotiations. There are stages when the costs of the conflict to the warring 
factions become higher than the benefits, or when the conflict has reached a stalemate. At 
such a stage, the leaders of the warring factions will usually negotiate and the resulting 
peace accord has a higher chance of holding. John Lederach notes that, “change from cycles 
of deadly violence to negotiation is possible only when the conflict and its perpetrating 
actors have reached a certain maturation point, then conciliation and negotiation efforts can 
be introduced with greater effectiveness and success.”16 Stefan Wolf quotes William 
Zartman, noting that 
Parties resolve their conflicts only when they are ready to do sowhen 
alternative, usually unilateral, means of achieving a satisfactory result are 
blocked and the parties feel they are in an uncomfortable and costly 
predicament. At that ripe moment they grab onto proposals that have been 
in the air for a long time and now appear attractive.17  
Bernard Gwertzman quotes the often-cited U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
saying that, “stalemate is the most propitious condition for settlement.”18 Therefore, it is 
important for an accord to be signed when the elite feel the stalemate hurts them instead of 
signing when they can still gain from it, because they may violate the accord and resort to 
conflict. 
2. Content of the Peace Agreement 
According to Stephen John Stedman, “the details of the peace agreement can be 
regarded as a ceiling for action or a floor from which agents can move forward to 
                                                 
16 Darby and MacGinty 31. 
17 I. William Zartman, “The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments1,” 
Global Review of Ethnopolitics 1, no. 1 (September 2001): 1, https://doi.org/10.1080/14718800108405087. 




implement their interpretation of the intent of the accords.”19 The literature concerning the 
content of peace agreements looks at the comprehensiveness of a peace agreement—that 
is, the possible solutions that will bring about peace within a conflict area. They include 
power-sharing, security arrangements, and a peacekeeping or monitoring force that are 
included in the peace accord. Karl DeRouen, Mark Ferguson, Scott Norton et al. note that 
“the content of the agreement is often considered a determinant of the agreement 
success.”20 They further quote Fortna, arguing that, “the content of the peace agreement is 
important as its provisions must make the costs of reinitiating the conflict outweigh the 
incentives to attack for one or both sides.”21 According to Adriane Guelke, implementation 
of an accord becomes difficult especially if it is not well detailed.22 A peace agreement 
that puts in place guarantees can stop hostilities. Further, Stedman observes that “peace is 
extremely fragile during implementation of agreements, nonetheless implementation is 
judged on the benchmark of how much was written and mutually agreed to is carried 
through.”23 The benchmark that Stedman observed will much be dependent on the elite’s 
commitment to carry out the peace accord. 
Power-sharing defines how the warring factions can access power and resources of 
the country after hostilities are stopped. Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie emphasize 
“power-sharing and power-sharing institutions as those rules that allocate decision-making 
rights and access to state resources among collectivities competing for power.”24 And they 
continue by saying that power-sharing can be divided into four areaspolitical, military, 
economic, and territorial. According to Arend Lijphart, power-sharing means 
                                                 
19 Stephen John Stedman et al., Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 141. 
20 Karl DeRouen et al., “Civil War Peace Agreement Implementation and State Capacity,” Journal of 
Peace Research 47, no. 3 (2010): 334 
21 Fortna, Peace Time, 10. 
22 Adrian Guelke. Negotiations and Peace Processes. in J. Darby et al. Contemporary Peacemaking: 
Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes, eds. John Darby and Roger MacGinty (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan UK, 2003), 53–55. 
23 Darby and MacGinty, 107. 
24 Caroline A. Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the 
Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars (University Park: Penn State Press, 2007). 
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representation of various common groups of people at the political decision-making 
level.25 Timothy Sisk looks at power-sharing as a way of combining democracy and 
managing conflicts in diversified communities.26 He looks at the problem of power-
sharing resulting in what he describes as political blackmail or cold peace, which is a result 
of not having a consensus on decisions being made by all parties. Nevertheless, the success 
of power-sharing very much depends on the cooperation of the elite. 
Power-sharing involves change of structures if a conflict has been between 
government and an insurgent rebel group, because there will be the creation of new posts 
and the elimination of others in institutions so as to accommodate as many stakeholders as 
possible. As Patrick Wight notes, mediators commonly emphasize the need to institute a 
multidimensional approach premised on inclusiveness, democracy, and institutional 
reforms; fundamentally, power-sharing involves ad hoc concessions intended to give 
opposition or rebel groups a stake in transitions to a normal democracy.27 Susan Stigant 
and Aly Verjee state the factors that are critical for power-sharing to succeed as trust, and 
cooperation of the elite of the different factions.28 The cooperation of the elites from both 
sides that have been included and those not included in the new structure is important for 
the durability of the peace agreement. There is a need for sacrifice on the part of the elite 
to have a lasting peace agreement. 
Security arrangements that include demilitarization of civilian areas, disarmament, 
demobilization, cantonment of forces, and formation of a new national force are critical for 
the durability of a peace accord. Fortna suggests that, “measures such as the withdrawal of 
forces, creation of demilitarized zones, formal cease-fire agreements, peacekeeping, third-
                                                 
25 Arend Lijphart, “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies,” Journal of Democracy 15, no. 2 
(2004): 96–109, https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2004.0029. 
26 Timothy D. Sisk, “Power Sharing after Civil Wars: Matching Problems to Solutions,” in 
Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Peace Processes and Post-War Reconstruction, ed. John Darby and 
Roger MacGinty (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2008), 195–209, https://doi.org/10.1057/
9780230584556_15. 
27 Patrick Wight, “South Sudan and the Four Dimensions of Power-Sharing: Political, Territorial, 
Military, and Economic,” African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review 7, no. 2 (2017): 1–35. 
28 Susan Stigant and Aly Verjee, “South Sudan’s Pitfalls of Power Sharing,” United States Institute of 
Peace, accessed November 21, 2018, https://www.usip.org/publications/2018/02/south-sudans-pitfalls-
power-sharing. 
9 
party guarantees and dispute resolution procedures should help foster peace that lasts.”29 
Joanna Spear argues “effective disarmament and demobilization of warring factions 
contribute to the security necessary for successful implementation of a civil war peace 
agreement.”30 
A peacekeeping or monitoring force is a critical factor to be included in the peace 
agreement. Peacekeeping, according to Virginia Fortna and Lise Morje Howard, “[which] 
was adopted for use in conflict zones, evolved beyond monitoring ceasefire lines and troop 
withdrawals or interposing personnel between opposing national armies to include more 
civilian tasks; human right monitoring, monitoring and running elections, monitoring and 
training police forces, providing humanitarian assistance, and assisting with the rebuilding 
of institutions.”31 Peacekeeping missions involve both military and civilian components. 
As Marco Jowell notes, whereas the military component is tasked with consolidating or 
establishing a conducive environment for the cessation of hostilities between the warring 
factions, the civilian component’s tasks involve a range of advisory, analytical, and 
collaborative tasks that include interpreting and assisting the implementation of the 
mandates of the peace agreements.32 “International peacekeepers interposed between 
belligerents can act as a physical constraint against attack,”33 notes Fortna. She adds that 
international troops’ presence, armed or unarmed, not only acts as a buffer to prevent 
accidents and clashes, but can also serve a monitoring function, investigating alleged 
violations and publicizing them. 
3. External Actors 
The literature considers at the role of external actors, especially as mediators, in 
bringing the warring factions to negotiations, serving as guarantors, and also being active 
                                                 
29 Fortna, “Scraps of Paper?,” 339. 
30 Stedman et al., Ending Civil Wars, 141. 
31 Virginia Page Fortna and Lise Morjé Howard, “Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping 
Literature,” Annual Review of Political Science 11, no. 1 (2008): 285, https://doi.org/10.1146/
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during implementation of the peace agreement. Mehmet Gurses, Nicolas Rost and Patrick 
McLeod note that third party presence does not only show the international community 
interest but also shows a commitment to ending the conflict. It is the mediators who usually 
bring belligerents to the negotiation table.34 The role of mediators, however, does not end 
at the signing of the accord. They continue to act as verifiers, that is, reassuring adversaries 
that the terms of the agreement are being fulfilled; as implementers, that is, imposing 
sanctions for non-performance of the agreement; and as reconcilers, that is, assisting in the 
long-term actions to create relationships between the warring factions35 The external actors 
can also act as guarantors during demobilization of soldiers. As Stedman notes, 
The ending of a civil war hinges on the willingness of competing armies to 
relinquish self-help solutions to their insecurity, to demobilize their soldiers 
and in most circumstances, to create a new, integrated army. These are 
processes, however, that are fraught with risks for antagonists. International 
implementors can reduce such risks by acting as guarantors.36 
About external actors as guarantors, Zahar says that “the involvement of external 
actors may go a long way to reassure former enemies; nevertheless, the strategic situation 
of actors continues to matter even for decision making even in the presence of a 
custodian.”37 The external actors therefore can control or eliminate peace agreement 
spoilers. According to Barbara Walter, mediators can play three roles that include 
informational, procedural, and monitoring to find out who is committed to the agreement 
and who is not.38 But the role of the mediators will depend on the level of trust the elites 
on both sides of the conflict have in them. 
Regional and international actors—that is, the countries neighboring the country 
where a civil war is taking place—play an important role in the peace agreement 
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implementation. Johan Brosche and Allard Duursma quote Svensson, arguing that the 
conflict is more likely to be resolved when the external considerations have been settled. 
Warring factions usually receive both financial and military assistance from foreign 
countries; once the foreign countries concentrate on negotiations instead of arming the 
factions, the conflict is likely to get resolved.39 Shifting the focus from supporting one 
party to mediating is helpful but insufficient because external actors need to build trust in 
the leadership of the faction they formerly opposed. Therefore, the flexibility and 
adoptability to changes of the leadership of warring factions is important if a peace accord 
is to last. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESIS 
The thesis examines the continuing civil war in South Sudan that began in 
December 2013, despite signing two ceasefire agreements—the ARCSS 2015 and the R-
ARCSS 2018. The examination of the problem focuses on the political and security elites’ 
role in the failed implementation of the two peace agreements. Given the nature of the 
background of South Sudan—that is, the road to independence, its demographics, and the 
SPLM; the ruling party, Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), and the economythe 
country was vulnerable to both internal and external threats that later resulted in a civil 
war. Arguably the vulnerabilities could have been avoided by guidance from the political 
and security elites to have a stable country. However, the elites promoted their personal 
interests instead of those of the country. 
Because of the elites prioritized the protection of their personal interests, when the 
two agreements were signed after the war broke out, the elites exploited the weaknesses in 
the agreements, which made implementations of the accords difficult. Weaknesses were 
seen during the negotiations, in the content of the agreements, and in the roles played by 
the international community. The elites’ exploitation of the weaknesses in both agreements 
may sustain led to the continuing civil war in South Sudan. 
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E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research considers the single case of South Sudan using the ARCSS 2015 and 
R-ARCSS 2018 peace agreements signed by the warring factions in the country that have 
not been implemented. Focusing on the two peace agreements allows the author to 
scrutinize the role played by the security and political elites in the continued civil war in 
South Sudan. Specifically, having exploited the weaknesses of the ARCSS 2015 agreement 
these elites are also exploiting the weaknesses of the R-ARCSS 2018 agreement, hence 
making its implementation difficult. Therefore, using this method this thesis determines 
whether the elite are interested primarily in the protection of their personal interests, not 
peace in the country. 
The research uses the extensive body of literature available concerning peace 
agreements, conflicts, and what has been written about South Sudan and the neighboring 
countries in particular; peer-reviewed books, journal articles, newspapers, and other 
publications are used. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis consists of four chapters. The first chapter has presented the research 
proposal—that is, the introduction, the major research question, literature review, potential 
explanation and hypothesis, and the design of the thesis. Chapter II presents the ARCSS 
2015; background on South Sudan, the South Sudan 2013 civil war and its causes, the 
summary of the ARCSS 2015, and an analysis of the role of the political and security elites 
in the failure of the ARCSS 2015 agreement. Chapter III presents the R-ARCSS 2018, a 
summary of the R-ARCSS 2018, and an analysis of the role of the elites in the failed 
implementation of the R-ARCSS 2018 agreement. Chapter IV presents a comparison of 
the two agreements and the conclusion. 
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II. AGREEMENT ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT 
IN SOUTH SUDAN—AUGUST 2015 
This chapter examines the contribution of the political and security elites of South 
Sudan to the failure of the ARCSS of August 2015. The civil war broke out in December 
2013 in the newest country in the world, only two years after gaining independence as a 
result of secession from Sudan. Independence was achieved after a two-decade civil war 
that ended with the signing of the CPA of January 2005.40 The current civil war broke out 
when rival troops within the presidential guard clashedthat is, troops from the Dinka 
tribe loyal to President Salva Kiir clashed with troops of the Nuer tribe loyal to Dr. Riek 
Machar.  
The chapter consists of four sections. The first section presents the background of 
South Sudan—the road to independence, its demographics, the SPLM (the ruling party), 
and the SPLA (the armed wing of the party), and the economy. The second section presents 
the causes of the civil war; the division within the ruling SPLM, the weak and divided 
SPLA; ethnic politics; and the poor state of the economy. The third section presents a 
summary of the ARCSS 2015. The final section examines the contribution of the political 
and security elites to the failure of the ARCSS 2015, which resulted in the continuation of 
the civil war.  
A. BACKGROUND 
This section of the chapter presents the background of South Sudan by looking at 
its road to independence on July 9, 2011, its demographics, the ruling party—the SPLM 
and the SPLA, the armed wing of the party, and South Sudan’s economy.  
South Sudan, as a country born in 2011, is a product of a two-decade civil war that 
began in 1983 and ended in 2005 with the signing of the CPA of 2005. The civil war was 
fought based on the north-south dichotomy. Various groups in the Christian and sub-Sahran 
African south, which included the SPLM/A and more than 60 “other armed groups” 
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(OAG),41 fought the Arab north whose life was dominated by Islam and the Arabic culture. 
The CPA was signed between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM as the leading 
opposition. All other AOGs were to be integrated with SPLM, even though they were 
enemies of SPLM. A referendum was taken in 2011, five years after the signing of the 
CPA, in which the people of South Sudan decided to secede from Sudan, hence gaining 
independence on July 9, 2011.42 South Sudan was to be led by an interim government 
under the leadership of President Salva Kiir, chairman of the SPLM, until the general 
elections to be held in 2015. Today, he is still the president, and no general elections have 
been conducted. 
Demographically, South Sudan has an estimated 13 million people consisting of 62 
tribes;43 the Dinka and Nuer being the largest two tribes followed by the Shilluk. The youth 
form the largest percentage of the population. The largest two tribes, which are further 
subdivided into clans, are rivals for dominance in the country’s political and economic 
spheres. The bigger percentage of the population is rural based. The country has ten states 
that fall under the three provinces of Bahr el Ghazal, Equatorial, and the Greater Upper 
Nile. 
SPLM, the ruling political party in South Sudan, was formed in May 1983 under 
the leadership of Col./Dr. John Garang, Joseph Oduho, and Martin Majiet. SPLM was a 
socialist party whose early leadership advocated for a new united Sudan, although 
internally secessionists advocated for an independent South Sudan.44 Nonetheless, the 
party’s rivals labeled the SPLM a communist party, which its founders denied. As Phillipa 
Scott notes, “throughout their meetings and press statements, both in Sudan and abroad, 
SPLM have continued to emphasize socialism as being the only ideology which can unify 
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a country of such sharp racial, religious and tribal diversities.”45 SPLM also cooperated 
with other parties that had opposing ideologies such as the Movement for Total Liberation 
of Southern Sudan  and the Council for Unity of Southern Sudan, whose ideology was 
based on secession from Sudan to form South Sudan. The SPLM today has splintered into 
other parties that include the SPLM-In Opposition (SPLM-IO) and the SPLM-Freed 
(SPLM-FD). The main SPLM is headed by President Salva Kiir. 
The SPLA was the armed wing of SPLM during the two-decade civil war and was 
boosted in its ranks by defections from the Sudan Armed Forces. Initially support for the 
SPLA came from the Dinka tribesmen, but the Nuer and Shilluk along with other tribes 
later joined. Overtime, the SPLA emerged as the leading warring faction. Consequently, 
during the CPA 2005 negotiations, in which the mediators and the Khartoum side made 
SPLA the major warring faction, some OAGs were to be integrated into the SPLA and 
others demobilized.46 Therefore, SPLM/A, the ruling party and the armed wing of South 
Sudan’s government, is a composition of personalities of different backgrounds who were 
brought together by circumstances. The different backgrounds have led to the politics of 
building power bases within SPLM based on ethnicity or ideology. 
The economy of South Sudan is fragile and still underdeveloped. The rate of 
unemployment is high and poor infrastructure like roads to link the would-be production 
areas to markets. The economy is characterized by rampant corruption, which prevents 
service delivery. The SPLM leadership is corrupt and used to quick enrichment as 
evidenced when millions of dollars meant for grain and infrastructure went missing in 
2005.47 The oil sector contributes the largest amount of revenue to the national budget.48 
When oil production shut down between January 2012 and April 2013 because of the 
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dispute with Sudan over tariffs, South Sudan’s economy was crippled.49 Inflation 
increased at an excessive rate as well as increasing the cost of living. Agriculture, which 
would have supplemented oil production, is of low productivity and based mainly on 
livestock. Therefore, with such an economy with little diversification, poverty is high, 
minimum attention is put on the health and education of the people and on the development 
of infrastructure. 
South Sudan has been vulnerable to internal and external stresses since its 
inception. The CPA 2005 itself was flawed,50 having attempted a quick fix to the Sudan 
conflict rather than looking at the underlying causes of the conflict. The country’s youth-
heavy demographic profile is characterized by high rates of unemployment and illiteracy. 
Ethnic rivalry between the two major tribes—the Dinka and Nuer – drive their struggles 
for political and economic dominance. This rivalry is exacerbated by small tribes like the 
Shilluk who at times make alliances with the two major tribes or sometimes fight alone for 
political and economic power dominance. South Sudan is ruled by the SPLM—a party with 
no common ideology – and leaders who put personal interests before those of the party or 
country. Overall the country has a fragile economy characterized by corruption, high 
inflation, and high rates of unemployment.  
B. CAUSES OF THE SOUTH SUDAN CIVIL WAR OF DECEMBER 2013 
A clash within the presidential guard—that is, between the Dinka tribesmen loyal 
to President Salva Kiir and the Nuer tribesmen loyal to the Vice President Dr. Riek 
Machar—in December 2013 sparked the civil war in South Sudan that is still raging today. 
Since then, an estimated 383,000 people have been killed, and nearly four million people 
have been displaced internally or fled to the neighboring countries.51 The civil war 
disrupted farming, leading to a food crisis that the UN Security Council in July 2014 
declared the “worst in the world.” Famine was also declared in the first few months of 
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2017.52 Luka Biong Deng Kuol and Sarah Logan claim that, “soldiers on all sides of the 
conflict continue to recruit children, rape and kill civilians, and plunder civilian 
property.”53 Although the media was quick to point to ethnicity as the cause, as Clement 
Pinaud notes, “as early as 16 December, the international media started to frame the new 
conflict in ethnic terms, based on the fact that Machar was a Nuer and Kiir a Dinka, 
disregarding the myriad other ethnic groups in the country and their grievances, as well as 
the fact that Kiir’s political prisoners belonged to various ethnic groups—including his 
own—and the SPLA chief of Staff remained a Nuer.”54 The civil war had other causes like 
divisions within SPLA, a weak army, and the economic situation in the country. This 
section of the chapter examines the causes of the civil war that include division within the 
ruling SPLM party, a weak and divided army (the SPLA), ethnic politics, and the poor state 
of the economy. 
1. Divisions within the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement  
The divisions within the SPLM date back to the civil war with Sudan and were 
exacerbated by ideological differences. Early on, differences erupted over secession or 
having a new socialist Sudan, but since South Sudan gained independence, divisions have 
been based on power blocs—that is, personalities within the party. 
The ideological differences within the party leadership that started during the early 
days of the party are still an issue that has not been addressed and is one of the reasons that 
the civil war broke out. Ideological differences date back to when John Garang advocated 
for a socialist, new unified Sudan, while other leaders like Akutot Atem advocated for 
secession. According to Israel Nyaburi Nyadera, 
the first split occurred at the nascent stages of the liberation struggle (1984–
85) and was more ideological and was anchored on the determination of the 
path the liberation struggle was to take. On one side, Akuot Atem Mayem 
and Gai Tut Yang were calling for an independent South Sudan, and on the 
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other John Garang, William Nyuon Banyi, and Kerubino Kuanyin Bol led 
the side that advocated for what they termed as a New Sudan which would 
be a more democratic, secular and pluralistic country.55  
Though the party split was handled at the time, the ideological division remained. Upon 
the death of Garang and succession by Salva Kiir, the issue of a New Sudan was abandoned 
as Kiir was a secessionist.  
Today it is no longer the ideological issue, however, but the blocs of power among 
the rulers and followers, and the direction of the party. Whereas people like Dr. Peter 
Adwok Nyaba, (a former cabinet minister accused by Kiir of plotting a coup), advocate for 
reforms and democracy in the party – Kiir, the president and chairman of the party, on the 
other hand, is not interested in reforms. It is partly because of these power blocs that the 
SPLM now has three groups or parties—that is, Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In 
Government (SPLM-IG), Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Opposition (SPLM-
IO), and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-Former Detainees (SPLM-FD). 
Kiir, whom Johnson observes “is a career soldier rather than a politician and much 
of the debate about the party direction has focused on his performance as president of South 
Sudan both during the interim period of 2005–11 and since independence in 2011.”56 Kiir 
had fallen out with Garang at the end of 2004 due to ideological differences.57 Having 
acquired the party leadership, Kiir replaced Garang’s loyalists with his supporters in order 
to strengthen his position. Although some of the Garang loyalists were eventually 
reinstated, according to Johnson quoting Adwok, “no mechanism of accountability was 
established within the government or the army, partly because of the continued rift between 
the president and the Garang loyalists.”58 The rift was made worse by some party leaders 
such as Pagan Amum, Nhial Deng Nhial, James Wani Igga, and Riek Machar—the then 
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vice president—who called on the president to not run in the 2015 elections. Consequently, 
Kiir decided to sack his cabinet and dissolve the party structures in July 2013.59 Kiir’s 
actions further divided the party. 
As tensions increased between the two groups—the pro-Kiir group and anti-Kiir 
group—Kiir detained 13 officials who included some sacked ministers and senior party 
officials and accused them of plotting a coup against his government. It was in this period 
also that troops loyal to Kiir in the presidential guard were sent to arrest Dr. Riek Machar, 
who had aslo been accused of a coup attempt. However, Machar’s loyalists resisted 
enabling Machar to escape and later on formed the SPLM-IO. Though Machar escaped, 
fighting between these rival forces continued and spilled into Juba and later to other parts 
of the country. As Katherine Almquist Knopf observes, “on December 15, 2013, South 
Sudan descended into its own civil war, when a simmering political struggle among 
President Kiir, First Vice President Machar and other elites over the leadership of the 
country’s governing party SPLM, sparked fighting in the capital Juba.”60 Therefore, failure 
to address the ideological differences within SPLM through dialogue is one reason the civil 
war broke out. 
2. Weak Sudan People’s Liberation Army  
A weak SPLA, with a weak background and inadequate training doctrine that 
integrated various armed groups including militias during the road to Independence and 
led by corrupt and unprofessional commanders, is another reason South Sudan has a civil 
war because it was not able to handle the threat when war broke out. The early formation 
of the SPLA was based on getting the numbers to fight the enemy; not many background 
checks were made as long as you were willing to fight. Along that line, Alex De Waal 
quotes Garang saying, “We did not start the movement in a classical way of the Latin 
American liberation movements with a small number of men. We started as a mob. We 
                                                 
59 Wight, “South Sudan and the Four Dimensions of Power-Sharing.”  
60 Katherine Almquist Knopf, Ending South Sudan’s Civil War (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2016). 
20 
have been in a series of reforms. Reforming a mob.”61 De Waal further notes, “SPLA’s 
militarism verged on nihilism exemplified by the naming of the SPLA’s Locust Division 
and the notorious slogans chanted by graduating soldiers. ‘Even my father, I will give him 
a bullet.’ You must live through the barrel of the gun, food, wife, and property must be 
acquired through your might.”62 Reforms that Garang wanted to carry out on the mob may 
have been easier if SPLA had a defined doctrine, and if the training the soldiers was aimed 
at reform, but this never happened. As Peter Adwok Nyaba noted, “The SPLA, instead of 
being a genuine liberation movement, turned into an agent of plunder, pillage, and 
destructive conquest. The strong link between being a soldier in the liberation movement 
and the solidarity with the people was completely absent. The SPLA became like an army 
of occupation in the areas they controlled and from which the people were running 
away.”63 Thus, when war broke out, it found an undisciplined army that looked at the gun 
barrel as a source of everything in life; hence, they promoted the violence instead of 
stopping it.  
The incorporation of various armed groups and militias with different agendas and 
some without training during the signing of the CPA, did not strengthen the SPLA, but 
brought about weakness and division within the army. The recognition of SPLA as the 
main armed opposition by the CPA 2005 meant that OAGs had to get integrated in the 
SPLA or fight on. Yet, when Kiir assumed leadership, he reached out to all of them because 
he feared they would disrupt the peace or, being financed by Khartoum, would cause 
insecurity.64 There were over 60 armed groups during the Juba declaration, when the SPLA 
signed an agreement of unity and integration with other OAGs.65 Nevertheless, the 
outreach to these groups, which came with financial benefits, usually benefitted the senior 
commanders of these groups but not the juniors. In addition, the commanders of the 
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incorporated groups got promoted and appointed to better posts; for instance, the former 
South Sudan Defense Forces chief of staff became deputy to Kiir, which frustrated the 
original SPLA officers, because they perceived rebellion against the system came with 
rewards. The trend created division and discontent within the army. About incorporation 
of AOGs, Edward Lino, a senior SPLM member has argued that,  
SPLA has never been a robust united force since we started to incorporate 
militia into it in appalling numbers. Each formation was taken was not fully 
absorbed in reality. But was left to wonder [sic] in uniform commanded by 
their previous jihadist officers. Each soldier was almost free to take whoever 
he chose to be commander! In reality, there is nothing called ‘SPLA’! It was 
divided and shredded into tribal formations adhering to individual 
commanders, based on localized understanding.66 
It is not surprising therefore that during the outbreak of the civil war, as Johnson notes, 
“most of the SPLA units that have mutinied against government come from incorporated 
anti-SPLA militias.”67 Although the Juba Declaration had good intentions, it was not well 
planned, and thus it weakened the SPLA, which could not handle internal disputes in the 
country.  
The SPLA is also weakened by the character of its commanders, with some being 
corrupt, and others lacking a sense of professionalism—that is, defecting or causing 
rebellion against the government in order to get the government to bargain with them to 
get financial benefits. Corruption in SPLA dates back to the 1983–2005 civil war. As de 
Waal notes, “commanders sold natural resources not only to finance the war but also the 
enrich themselves. Commanders became ‘military aristocrats’ using a raft of coercive, 
corrupt and patrimonial measures.”68 Presently corruption is still going on, manifesting 
itself in the inflated payrolls of soldiers. “The SPLA’s internal audit suggested a minimum 
of 40,000 ‘ghost soldiers’ whose salaries are pocketed by their commander,”69 observed 
de Waal. The presence of ‘ghost soldiers’ leads to inefficiency, as the actual units are 
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smaller than required for the tasks assigned. Moreover, senior officers in the SPLA, 
including  Gen. Peter Gadet and David Yau Yau, have defected or started rebellions against 
the government with the aim of getting the government to negotiate with them to get 
financial benefits and more influential government posts.70 It was not a surprise to many 
that Gen. Gadet was the first senior SPLA officer with his 8th Division to defect to SPLA–
IO, from which he also defected to form his own rebel faction, the South Sudan United 
Movement.71 Therefore, a force with commanders who are corrupt and lack 
professionalism like Gen. Gadet cannot be effective and is always unable to defend the 
nation’s interests. 
Consequently, the SPLA, with the integration of OAGs, who were not trained on a 
common doctrine after the integration, found that it had no cohesion. In addition to the 
corrupt and unprofessional commanders, the SPLA became what Rolandsen calls “a 
bloated, fragmented and ill-disciplined army.”72 A weak and fragmented SPLA was one 
of the reasons that South Sudan erupted in civil war. 
3. Ethnic Politics 
Ethnic rivalry between the Dinka tribe and the Nuer tribe over power and resource 
control also fueled the civil war. The two largest tribes in the country have a history of 
rivalry dating back to when they competed for pasture and cattle.73 Yet, in South Sudan as 
in some other parts of Africa, the elite are using ethnic identity to control political power 
and resources.74 This was the case in 1991, following the fallout of Riek Machar, Lam 
Akol of the Nuer tribe and John Garang, a Dinka, over the leadership of SPLA. Machar 
having failed to take over the leadership of SPLA, formed a splinter group—SPLA-Nasir, 
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ethnically aligned to the Nuer tribe. This group went on to massacre more than 2,000 people 
in Bor who belonged to the Dinka tribe of Garang.75 Although Machar, having been 
appointed Vice President, apologized to the people of Bor, that massacre is used by the 
Dinka elite to sow tribal hatred. As Knopf notes, “senior government officials including 
Kiir, regularly cite the 1991 massacre in Bor, Jonglei state, as evidence of the Nuer’s 
engrained hatred for the Dinka.”76 Thus, the elite, knowing that a tribe is an important 
identical aspect, have used the identity to mobilize people whenever disagreements 
develop. Hence when the December 2013 war broke out, mobilization by the elite was 
based on ethnicity. As Johnson observes, “Salva’s personal unit, whether in uniform of the 
presidential guard or other units including police, went through largely Nuer 
neighborhoods and carried out indiscriminate killings and targeted murders of specific 
people.”77 With such rhetoric and actions from the armed Dinka people, the Nuer might 
have perceived the attacks on them as preplanned; hence in areas dominated by the Nuer, 
similar attacks were perpetrated against the Dinka. Therefore, the ethnic rivalry of the two 
largest tribes was used by the rival elites to mobilize their respective ethnic groups.  
Unity between the two largest ethnic groups greatly deteriorated after South Sudan 
gained independence in 2011, when the most compelling unifying factor—fighting the 
Khartoum government—got out of the way. The disunity between the two largest ethnic 
groups in South Sudan created a rivalry that was also another contributing factor to the 
civil war in South Sudan. Politics of identity based on ethnicity surfaced as most of the 
elites tried to strengthen their powers bases through recruitment of their fellow tribemates. 
According to Madut Kon, “after its independence in July 2011, the SPLM ruling party and 
its leadership slipped into an ethno-centric approach of governance which depended 
heavily on nepotism and political appointments over skills and qualification of potential 
candidates. Such a practice led to a weak system of governance, political party and 
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bureaucratic functions in the country.”78 The weak systems built on such a foundation 
could not withstand strong internal stresses like those that affected South Sudan in the 
second part of 2013. Therefore, it was not surprising that when war broke out in December 
2013, many elites looked at tribes as the unifying factor—that is, they mobilized against 
each other along ethnic lines, which increased the rivalry between the largest tribes in the 
country. The increased rivalry was another reason for the civil war. 
4. Government Failure to Address Poor Economic Conditions 
The state of the economy of South Sudan has remained weak since the attainment 
of independence in 2011, with high rates of unemployment among the youth, high inflation 
rates,  salaries of the civil servants who were not being paid, and poor service delivery, as 
well as a high rate of corruption among government officials.79 This state of the economy 
brought such discontentment to the people that it was easy to mobilize them against the 
government. The economy sank into deeper problems when the government switched off 
oil production in January 2012,80 which was contributing about 98 percent of the country’s 
total revenue. The country faced a hyper-inflation rate of 550 percent and the Sudanese 
pound lost 90 percent of its value.81 Civil servants including the security personnel went 
for months without salaries. Along these lines, Mairi John Blackings observes that “most 
countries in comparable situations would give the security sector preferential treatment to 
offset unrest and buy loyalty. But preferential treatment notwithstanding, the South Sudan 
security sector has not been spared the irregularity either, not least due to corrupt practices 
and misappropriation of soldiers’ pay.”82 With a large number of unemployed youth and 
unpaid armed personnel, South Sudan was ripe for a conflict, because the two groups had 
to look for a means of survival. As Blackings notes, “war has a tendency to empower youth 
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and armed combatants, giving them privileged positions, power and control over especially 
resources. The advent of peace threatens this.”83 Therefore, when war broke out in South 
Sudan, the unemployed youth and unpaid armed combatants took the chance to access 
power and resources, which also contributed to the civil war. 
Corruption by government officials also led to poor service delivery, fragile 
infrastructure, and a breakdown of the economy as a whole.84 Corruption by leaders in 
governments typically affects service delivery.85 Kiir has acknowledged corruption within 
SPLM in the past and even today, although he has not shown any steps in fighting it. De 
Waal quotes Kiir (before he was chairman) during his meeting with the late Garang in late 
2004 saying, 
I would also like to say something about the rampant corruption in the 
movement. At the moment some members of the movement have formed 
private companies, bought houses and have huge bank accounts in foreign 
countries. I wonder what kind of system we are going to establish in South 
Sudan considering ourselves indulged [sic] in this respect.86 
In 2012, Kiir (when he was chairman) again acknowledged corruption by his government 
officials when more than $4 billion is believed to have been diverted to personal 
accounts.87 Corruption has not only affected service delivery but also has led to a poor 
investment environment. Foreign investment in industry and agriculture, for instance, 
would have created jobs for the youth who make up the bulk of the population of South 
Sudan. Poor service delivery by governments and high unemployment make governments 
vulnerable to civil unrest. 
Therefore, when the war broke out in December 2013, it was easy to mobilize the 
people against those in government; on the other hand, however, the government mobilized 
those who were benefiting from the corruption, stoking the civil war.  
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The civil war that started in December 2013 in South Sudan was caused by the 
divisions in the ruling SPLM, the weak and unprofessional SPLA, politics of ethnicity, and 
the poor state of the economy. The effects of this war were felt not only by the people of 
South Sudan, but also socially and economically by regional countries.88 Because of the 
effects the civil war, efforts to bring the war to an end by the regional bloc 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) started as early as January 2014, 
when a cessation of hostilities was agreed on and the agreement signed in Addis Ababa by 
the two main warring factions.89 Although hostilities did not cease, talks continued until 
the ARCSS was signed in August 2015. The next section of the chapter summarizes what 
was agreed upon in the ARCSS. 
C. SIGNING AND PROVISIONS OF THE ARCSS 2015 
After negotiations that took almost two years, the ARCSS was signed on August 
17, 2015. A Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU) of the Republic of South 
Sudan was to be formed to run the government and implement the agreement until general 
elections were held.90 The following section summarizes the agreement by looking at the 
signatories—i.e., the parties, stakeholders, guarantors, IGAD mediation team and the 
international partners; the composition of the power-sharing TGoNU; security 
arrangements; resource management; a truth and reconciliation commission; and the joint 
monitoring and evaluation effort.  
The signatories of the ARCSS 2015 represented the categories shown in Tables 1 
through 3, along with the names of those who signed for each category.91 
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Table 1. The Parties: Signatories for Political Parties92 
Party Name 
SPLM/A-IG H.E Salva Kiir  
SPLM/A-IO H.E. Dr. Riek Machar 
Former Detainees (FD) Mr. Pagan Okech 
Other Political Parties Mr. Lam Akol  
Table 2. The Organizations: Signatories for Organizations93 
Organization Name 
Civil Society of South Sudan Alokiir Malual Aguer  
Faith-based leaders of South Sudan Bishop Enock Tombe Lolo 
Women’s bloc of South Sudan    Amer Manyok Deng 
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Table 3. The Guarantors: Heads of State Signatories94 
Country Head of State 
Ethiopia  H.E. Hailemariam Dessalegn 
Sudan H.E. Omar Hassan al-Bashir 
Uganda H.E. Yoweri Museveni 
Djibouti H.E. Ismail Omar Guelleh 
Somalia H.E. Hassan Sheikh Mahmud 
Kenya H.E. Uhuru Kenyatta 
 
Other signatories of the agreement included the African Union, a High Level Ad 
hoc Committee for South Sudan, representatives from Algeria, Chad, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
South Africa, and the African Union commission. The members for the IGAD mediation 
team included Ambassador Seyoum Msefin, Gen. Lazarus Sumbeiywo, and Gen. 
Mohamed El-Dabi. The international partners had representatives from China, Norway, the 
United Kingdom, United States, UN, EU, and IGAD Partners Forum (IPF). 
1. Transitional Government of National Unity  
The ARCSS 2015 proposed a power-sharing TGoNU, which was tasked to 
implement the agreement. The transition period for the TGoNU was to be 33 months from 
the signing of the agreement until a democratically elected government took office. The 
power-sharing ratios for the executive were as follows: 53 percent for SPLM-IG, 33 
percent for SPLM-IO, 7 percent for FD, and 7 percent for other political parties. Decision 
making was to be based on consultations and in cases of a deadlock if two-thirds of the 
executives were in agreement, the decision could be taken. At the state level, the conflict 
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affected states of Unity and Upper Nile, where the governors would be nominated by 
SPLM-IO and appointed by the president. Jonglei, on the other hand, would be governed 
by SPLM-IG in the remaining seven states, where 85 percent of the governorships would 
originate from SPLM-IG.95 
The legislature, which was to be called Transitional National Legislative Assembly, 
was to be expanded from 332 members to 400. The ratios for the additional 68 were to be 
50 members from SPLM-IO, one member from FD, and 17 members from other political 
parties.96 
2. Security Arrangements in the ARCSS 2015 
The security arrangements named the Government of the Republic of South Sudan 
and the South Sudan Armed Opposition as the warring factions. The warring factions were 
to establish a unified command of National Defense Forces of South Sudan (NDFSS) upon 
signing the agreement. Complete unification of forces was expected to take 18 months. The 
security and permanent ceasefire arrangements were to come into effect 72 hours after the 
signing of the agreement. According to the agreement, “the permanent ceasefire called for 
cessation of hostilities, disengagement, separation and withdrawal of forces including allies 
of both parties.”97 State actors were to disarm, demobilize, and repatriate non-state actors 
supporting different factions. The warring factions were to declare locations of their forces 
down to battalion level. The forces of the warring factions in combat in the areas of Juba, 
Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile states were to be cantoned. Juba was to be demilitarized, 
within a 25-kilometer radius from the center of the national capital. The presidential guard 
and the integrated police were the only armed forces to stay in Juba. The integrated police 
force was to be deployed in Bor, Malakal, Bentui, and other locations for protection of 
civilian sites.98 
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3. Resources Management in the ARCSS 2015 
Regarding resources, the agreement stated that the “wealth of South Sudan shall be 
shared equitably so as to enable each level of government to discharge its reconstruction, 
development, legal and constitutional obligations, duties and responsibilities.”99 The Bank 
of South Sudan was to be restructured in the areas of leadership, composition, powers, 
functions, and operations. New institutions included National Revenue Authority, Public 
Procurement and Asset Disposal Authority, Salaries and Remuneration commission, 
Environmental Management Authority, and the Research and Development centers. 
According to the agreement, “the current employment in the oil sector was to be reviewed 
given that employment in this sector had not been based on merit and competence, but 
largely on ethnic, political and regional considerations.”100  
4. Truth, Reconciliation, and Healing in the ARCSS 2015 
The commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH) would be 
established by the TGoNU. The CTRH would be responsible for addressing issues of 
conflict, promotion of peace, and national reconciliation and healing. The CTRH was to 
inquire into all human rights violations committed on the peoples of South Sudan by both 
state and non-state actors. Hence, the CTRH would “recommend processes for full 
enjoyment by victims of the right to remedy, including by suggesting measures for 
reparations and compensation.”101 
5. Monitoring and Evaluation of the ARCSS 2015 
A Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism Commission (JMEC) was 
established. The JMEC was tasked with the oversight role of the Transitional 
Government’s mandate, accord implementation, and parties’ adherence to the accord 
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schedules.102 The IGAD assembly in consultations with the IGAD-PLUS partners was to 
nominate a prominent African to chair the JMEC.103   
D. THE ELITES AND THE ARCSS 2015 
This section examines the role of the political and security elites of South Sudan in 
the failure of the ARCSS 2015. The role is examined by looking at the peace negotiations 
i.e., the level of inclusivity during the negotiations, the willingness of the warring factions 
to negotiate in a trustful manner, and the timing of the negotiations; the content of the peace 
agreement, to include power-sharing, demilitarization, and peacekeeping or monitors; and 
the external actors, i.e, regional and international actors and the mediators.  
1. Peace Negotiations 
The limited scope of stakeholders during negotiations led to the creation of spoilers 
i.e new rebel groups and other political parties that contributed to the collapse of the 
ARCSS 2015. Spoilers are sometimes a creation of limited inclusivity during 
negotiations.104 The ARCSS 2015 negotiations lacked enough inclusivity as the leaders of 
the two main warring factions—President Salva Kiir of SPLM-IG and Dr. Riek Machar of 
SPLM-IO who viewed themselves as the only people who could bring an end to the civil 
war in South Sudan. The two leaders viewed a wider inclusion of other stakeholders as a 
way of reducing their bargaining power at the negotiating table. Yet, according to Zacharia 
Akol, “including other stakeholders in the process beyond the principal parties to the 
conflict is seen as fundamental to the attainment of a sustainable peace.”105 Partially as a 
result of inadequate inclusion, new groups like the National Salvation Front of Gen. 
Thomas Cirillo, the National Democratic Movement of Dr. Lam Akol, and the South Sudan 
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Movement for Change  of Joseph Bangasi Bakosoro were formed and went on to fight the 
TGoNU.  
Limited inclusivity during the negotiations resulted in limited ownership of the 
accord. Inclusivity (or a lack thereof) is key to understanding the nexus between the input 
and outcome dimensions of a peace process.106 Ownership of the peace agreement is one 
of the outcomes of inclusivity in a peace agreement; limited inclusivity results into limited 
ownership. Although Kiir and Machar eventually accepted a few other stakeholders to join 
the negotiations, they were not to participate directly in the negotiations but to act as 
observers. But even some of the accepted stakeholders’ delegations were manipulated to 
suit the interests of the two leaders of the main factions. For instance, the civil society 
organizations’ (CSO) delegation that represented more than 60 CSOs was disbanded and 
reorganized, bringing the delegation numbers down to 14 members; seven members 
representing SPLM-IG and seven members representing SPLM-IO, hence abandoning the 
more than 60 CSOs.107 The manipulation of these delegations reduced the number of 
stakeholders. Limited inclusivity during negotiations meant limited ownership of the 
agreement, and this affected its implementation as the elites looked at it as an agreement 
between Kiir and Machar, which was another reason for the collapse of the accord.  
The political and security elites of the warring factions did not negotiate in good 
faith and there was much mistrust of each other to the extent that each party signed at 
different dates. Actually, the government had refused to sign, but later signed after pressure 
from the international community.108 Because the agreement was signed under pressure, 
there was no ownership of the agreement, and ownership of the agreement starts during the 
negotiations by creating trust among the different parties. In fact, it is along these lines that 
George Hokker quoted President Kiir saying, 
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I recently signed an internationally brokered peace accord to end an 
insurrection against my government that has plagued us for almost half of 
our young nation’s life. I did not accede to this deal because it is perfect [;] 
indeed, the plan undermines the sovereignty and democratic institutions of 
our nation in key, unfortunate ways. Most obviously, by installing 
representatives of breakaway factions in equal power, it rewards 
insurrection and violence over persuasion and democracy thereby 
conferring equal status on an elected representative government and a rebel 
faction, and cementing tribal and ethnic divisions that have kept too many 
nations from realizing peace or their full potential. Despite the misgivings, 
last month I committed our people, their nation and their government to the 
compromise peace agreement.109  
Kiir’s words show a lack of trust and faithfulness, not only in the negotiations, but also the 
other faction he negotiated with. He refers to them as a rebel faction being rewarded for 
their insurrection. On the other hand, even the SPLM-IO leadership looked at Kiir as the 
only stumbling block to peace in South Sudan. Although they disagreed on many issues, 
one of the biggest unifying factors among them was the removal of Kiir from power.110 
There was mistrust on both sides, but they signed the accord because of pressure and short-
term personal interests. Personal interests were threatened by individual sanctions imposed 
on the elites. As Knopf notes, “In August 2015, largely as a result of the threat of targeted 
UN sanctions against individuals on both sides of the conflict and an imposition of an arms 
embargo, Machar and then Kiir, signed a power–sharing agreement.”111 How could such 
a peace accord succeed with such mistrust and hatred among the actors? For a peace 
agreement to hold there has to be sincerity and trust among the parties negotiating peace 
and the outcome of the negotiations.112 Therefore, the mistrust between the elites of the 
negotiating factions led to conclusions that were not owned by either side; thus, it became 
difficult to implement the conclusions which contributed to the collapse of the agreement. 
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The timing of the agreement was also a drawback because the political and security 
elites of the warring factions each felt that their respective side could still win the war 
without negotiations. According to William Zartman, “Parties resolve their conflict only 
when they are ready to do so—when the alternative, usually unilateral means of achieving 
a satisfactory result are blocked and the parties feel that they are in an uncomfortable and 
costly predicament.”113 Zartman’s view, however, was not applicable to the conflict in 
South Sudan at the time. Before the signing of the ARCSS 2015, several ceasefire 
agreements had been signed and violated.114 As James Copnall notes, “President Salva 
Kiir and rebel leader Riek Machar have in the past committed to stopping the fighting, only 
for both sides to break their word and launch offensives,”115 indicating that each side felt 
it could win the war. Kiir’s SPLM-IG continued getting military support from Uganda, and 
it is alleged that Sudan continued supplying logistics and weapons to Riek Machar’s 
SPLM-IO,116 which support they felt could help win the war rather than negotiating. There 
were defections and counter-defections from both warring factions. Some of the defections 
affected the negotiations because the receiving side sometimes felt it had gained an edge 
over the other, leading to violations of the ceasefires. The continued postponement of 
Machar’s arrival in Juba117 by Salva Kiir also points to the fact that Kiir still looked at 
options other than the peace agreement. The elites, therefore, took advantage of the hurried 
negotiations, not only to reorganize and strengthen their forces but to expand on the areas 
of influence, which also led to the failure of the ARCSS 2015.  
The lack of inclusivity resulting from Kiir’s and Machar’s protection of their 
respective interests; the mistrust among the stakeholders and the poor timing of the 
negotiations as the leaders of each side felt they could win the war without negotiations led 
                                                 
113 Zartman, “The Timing of Peace Initiatives,” 8. 
114 Denis Dumo,”South Sudan President Signs Peace Deal despite Concerns,” Reuters, August 26, 
2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southsudan-unrest-president-idUSKCN0QV1MF20150826. 
115 James Copnall, “South Sudan: Obstacles to a Lasting Peace,” BBC, August 26, 2015, sec. Africa, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33912156. 
116 Copnall. 
117 John Peter Malish, “A Second Chance to Deliver Peace through Power Sharing: A Comparative 
Analysis of South Sudan Peace Agreements,” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2018, https://doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.3393338. 
35 
to the collapse of the ARCSS 2015. But it was not only the shortcomings of peace 
negotiations that the political and security elites exploited to sabotage the accord; they also 
took advantage of its content, which is discussed in the next section.  
2. Content of the ARCSS 2015  
The content of a peace agreement is critical to its success because it is the content 
that must be implemented by the stakeholders involved in the negotiations. This section 
examines the relationship between the contentincluding power-sharing, security 
arrangements, and the monitoring of the agreementand the elites to the failure of the 
agreement.  
The power-sharing deal favored the two warring factions and involved President 
Salva Kiir retaining the presidency with full executive powers while Dr. Riek Machar was 
reappointed vice president. The executive was divided according to the following ratios: 
53 percent to SPLM-IG, 33 percent to SPLM-IO, 7 percent to SPLM-FD, and 7 percent to 
other political parties. Power-sharing at the state level was shared between the two main 
warring factions, leaving out the other parties: With the ten states, SPLM-IO was to appoint 
governors in the Unity and Upper Niles states, while SPLM-IG was to appoint the governor 
of Jongolei state. SPLM-IG was to take 85 percent and SPLM-IO 15 percent of the 
governorship of the remaining seven states. The legislature was to be expanded from 300 
to 400 members. The added 68 slots were to be shared as follows: 50 for SPLM-IO, one 
for SPLM-FD, and 17 for other political parties. 
The power-sharing deal as stated in the ARCSS 2015 was not accepted by some 
elites as they felt it was not catering to their interests. The elites who opposed the power-
sharing deal thus sabotaged its implementation, which became another factor in the 
collapse of the agreement. President Kiir voiced his dislike of the power-sharing agreement 
as he looked at it as rewarding those who rebelled against an elected government;118 on 
the other hand, powerful generals Peter Gadet and Gathoth Gatkouth broke away from 
SPLM-IO because of their opposition to Machar signing the power-sharing agreement. 
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Gen. Gatkuoth condemned the deal, claiming it was not for the whole of South Sudan, 
although he did not specify who and which part of the country it benefited. The general 
was quoted saying, “if they don’t listen to us, they’ll listen to bullets.”119 As for the CSOs, 
they felt too much emphasis was put on the power-sharing deal among the elites rather than 
on the issues.120 Issues such as humanitarian assistance and construction, and 
reconciliation mechanisms of the divided society were not given enough space and time; 
yet they were key issues if the accord was to succeed.121 If the leaders of the factions 
during negotiations did not support the final power-sharing agreement in the peace accord, 
then how could it be implemented? As Caroline A. Hartzell and Mathew Hoddie observe,  
Neither the design or implementation of power-sharing and power-dividing 
institutions is a cost-free process; antagonists must typically abandon their 
interests in sole control of the state in exchange for the compromises 
associated with the sharing or dividing of power. The willingness of 
adversaries to endure these costs over time has the potential to serve a costly 
indicator of their commitment to an enduring peace.122  
The security arrangements agreed upon during the negotiations by the two main 
warring factions – including a permanent ceasefire, assembly and cantonment of forces, 
demilitarization of some areas, and having a unified command after the signing of the 
agreement – were violated by the elites in the conflict. The ceasefire was not respected as 
the two main factions are composed of different groups with different command structures 
and different interests; the leadership did not have control over the commanders in the field. 
SPLM-IO was originally composed of Nuer senior officers who escaped, after the outbreak 
of the war, from Juba and the “white Army,” a local militia mainly from the local 
communities. Later on, however, other generals such as Peter Gadet, James Koang, and 
Garouth Gatkouth joined.123 The generals who later joined came with their forces, whose 
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loyalty was always to them individually not to SPLM-IO. Fortna opines that the “existence 
of factions on either side might disrupt peace. Even if the leadership negotiated in good 
faith, it may not be able to control all of its military or civilians. Rogue groups of irregular 
forces, local commanders, or even individuals may violate the ceasefire.”124 Augustiono 
Mayai, Jok Madut and Nhial Tiitmamer observe that, “in absence of a coherent military 
command, chances are that a sufficiently functioning cessation of hostilities could not be 
attained.”125 They further note that field commanders, not their superiors, seem to have 
the final say.  
Absence of a coherent unified command meant that commanders of different units 
of the same faction or commanders of different factions communicated to their forces only 
issues that were in their interests about the security arrangements of the ARCSS 2015. 
Those not interested in the ceasefire never communicated its existence down to the last 
man, which meant continued fighting. Thus because of personal interests, individual 
commanders, such as Gen. Gathothi Gatkuothi, broke ranks with SPLM-IO, formed their 
own rebel groups and started fighting both the SPLM-IG and SPLM-IO. The breaking of 
ranks with the main factions also contributed to the collapse of the peace agreement. 
The capital city, Juba, and some other state capitals like Bor, Malakal, and Bentui 
were to be demilitarized and all troops of warring factions withdrawn. Juba was to be 
demilitarized for a radius of 25 kilometers. Only troops from the presidential guard brigade 
and those guarding the barracks were to remain but withdrawal and demilitarization of the 
named areas was ignored. “Withdrawal of troops from the front line, creation of a 
demilitarized buffer zone, and arms control make remobilizing for war more difficult,”126 
notes Fortna. Kiir objected to the arrangement claiming that the army had a duty to protect 
the people and the leadership throughout the country, giving an example of the military’s 
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role during the “failed coup” of 2013.127 Although Kiir’s presidential guard was not to 
leave Juba, he did not feel comfortable with the rest of his SPLA leaving the city. For 
personal security reasons Riek Machar moved with a personal protection force when 
moving to Juba to take up the post of vice president in the TGoNU. The presence of two 
rival forces—the SPLA-IO and SPLM-IGin Juba heightened tension in an already fragile 
situation. As tensions increased, the two forces clashed in July 2016, forcing Machar to 
flee into exile once again. Machar’s escape from Juba further affected the implementation 
of the ARCSS 2015 and partly contributed to its collapse.  
The warring factions were supposed to declare the dispositions of their forces down 
to the battalion level, as well as the cantonment of the declared troops, and they were to 
carry out the disarmament of militias. All these activities aimed at facilitating the 
unification of the forces into one force under one command. However, none of this was 
carried out. As Charles Call and William Stanley argue, “a basic goal of any civil war 
settlement is to re-establish a legitimate state monopoly over the use of force in society, 
under the terms agreeable to the parties to the conflict.”128 Because of the mistrust between 
the leaders of the warring factions and personal interests of the leaders, each one wanted 
to stay in command of his forces rather than passing it on for the sake of peace. Lack of a 
coherent command structure and an aligned goal of the conflict in the factions made 
declaration of dispositions of troops difficult. For instance, the commanders of the white 
army, a local Nuer militia, under the SPLM-IO umbrella resisted unification because they 
claimed their reason for joining the conflict was avenging the Juba massacres of December 
2013, in contrast with Machar who solely wanted power.129 As Zach Vertin notes about 
the SPLM-IO, “in addition to seeking justice for the massacre of Nuer civilians in Juba, 
most opposition fighters retained more hardline demands than their de facto leader.”130 
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Because of their different interests, the elites claimed to represent the security arrangements 
that never materialized, and the ARCSS 2015 failed. 
President Salva Kiir was opposed to some roles of the Joint Monitoring and 
Evaluation Commission (JMEC), which made work difficult for the commission and points 
to another reason for the failure of the agreement. The JMEC was established to monitor 
and the implementation of the agreement. It was to be headed by a prominent African and 
its membership was to comprise the stakeholders to the agreement. Kiir was opposed to 
the JMEC’s power to veto some decisions, as he was quoted when commenting on the 
ARCSS, “there is a supra-national Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, to be 
headed by a foreigner and with absolute power over the decisions of the government even 
if the parties forming the governing coalition are in agreement.”131 The power to veto was 
to check his faction in the TGoNU, which had the majority and thus would use the numbers 
to pass policies that favored him. Hence, he had to oppose it. But even then, although he 
claimed to have opposed the JMEC’s power to veto, he never said which powers he 
supported. Opposing the JMEC meant the failure of the ARCSS since no one could monitor 
the agreement’s implementation.  
The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMSS) had no mandate to intervene 
in the fighting, which the commanders of the main warring factions exploited when the 
factions clashed in July 2016 (after reinstating Machar as the vice president).132 
Peacekeepers can perform a dual role as monitors or as a physical barrier between the 
warring factions, and the mandate under which they operate can go a long way to ensure 
peace. But in the case of South Sudan, where no proper demarcation was identified between 
the SPLM-IO and the SPLM-IG, UNMSS had little it could do. Secondly, as a monitor 
UNMSS could do little when Kiir refused to demilitarize Juba and when Machar returned 
to Juba with a large force for his personal protection. Therefore, the commanders of SPLM-
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IG attacked SPLM-IO in Juba, exploiting the limited mandate of UNMSS as regards the 
ARCSS 2015, which also contributed to the collapse of the ARCSS 2015.  
Because the political and security elites felt that their interests were not catered to 
by the power-sharing deal and the security arrangements, they exploited the weaknesses in 
the mandate of the peacekeepers and sabotaged the ARCSS 2015. The lack of support from 
the elites for the content of the accord was not helped by their actions or those of external 
actors, which is discussed in the next section. 
3. External Actors 
The political and security elites in South Sudan exploited a weakness of regional 
actors, protecting their interests instead of a lasting peace. This was another factor that 
contributed to the failure of the ARCSS 2015. Neighboring countries like Uganda had their 
own interests to protect; for instance, Uganda had security concerns such as Kony’s rebels 
crossing back to Uganda, but it also had economic interests since South Sudan was one of 
Uganda’s largest trading partners.133 Ugandan troops were deployed at the beginning of 
the conflict and they participated in  evacuations, but they later fought alongside Kiir’s 
troops.134 The January 214 agreement to cease hostilities called for the withdrawal of all 
foreign forces supporting the factions, but Ugandan troops did not withdraw, which 
strengthened Kiir’s hold on power. Whereas Kiir used Ugandan troops’ deployment in 
South Sudan to strengthen his position on the ground, the opposition negotiators used the 
deployment as an excuse not to participate when Uganda was invited to the negotiations as 
stakeholders by IGAD.135 Although Ugandan troops were later withdrawn, suspicion 
continued of Kiir getting support from Uganda in terms of that country being a conduit for 
his arms.  
As the youngest country in the world, South Sudan did not have a strong 
foundation. The country has leaders who have failed to transform from the rebellion days 
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to leading a country. The SPLM is characterized by self-seeking leaders who failed to build 
institutions because it would affect their personal interests. SPLA, the SPLM’s military 
wing, lacked professionalism, and integrated various militia forces without training and a 
common doctrine. Ethnic politics promoted by the elites in the daily lives of the South 
Sudanese affected the unity of the country. Coupled with a fragile economy led by corrupt 
leaders, these factors were critical to the outbreak of a civil war in December 2013. 
Efforts to bring peace to the war-ravaged country were spearheaded by the regional 
body IGAD, which led to the ARCSS 2015. But because of the political and security elites’ 
interests, the agreement was not fully implemented, and thus, it failed. The failure of 
ARCSS 2015, in turn, led to the continuation of the civil war until September 2018 when 
another effort by IGAD to bring peace to South Sudan through negotiations under the 
Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the conflict in South Sudan was signed. The 
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III. THE REVITALIZED AGREEMENT ON THE RESOLUTION 
OF THE CONFLICT IN SOUTH SUDAN—SEPTEMBER 2018 
Despite the signing of the ARCSS 2015 and Riek Machar taking on the post of vice 
president, there was no cessation of hostilities. Not only did the fighting continue between 
the two main warring factions—the SPLM-IG and the SPLM-IO—but also among other 
rebel factions that were formed by the security elite, allegedly in the interests of their people 
who were not served by the ARCSS 2015. The elite exploited issues such as continued 
ethnic rivalry between the two main rival tribes—the Dinka and the Nuer. Furthermore, the 
activities of neighboring countries,136 and the limited mandate of the UNMISS, 
contributed to fail the ARCSS agreement. Having realized that ARCSS 2015 was failing 
to solve the conflict in South Sudan, IGAD at the 58th extra-ordinary session on July 25, 
2017, formed the High-level Revitalization Forum (HLRF) with the sole aim of reviving 
the peace process in order to bring the conflict to the end.137 The HLRF was responsible 
for organizing and coordinating various stakeholders in the conflict in South Sudan. After 
15 months of negotiations, the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in 
South Sudan 2018 (R-ARCSS 2018) was signed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.138 The R-
ARCSS 2018 established a Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity 
(RTGoNU),139 retaining President Salva Kiir as the president; however, this time with five 
vice presidents unlike the ARCSS August 2015 which had only two vice presidents. Dr. 
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Riek Machar was named the first vice president. Although the R-ARCSS 2018 was signed, 
fighting resumed shortly after140 and almost nothing has been implemented until today.  
This chapter examines the role of the political and security elites in the failure to 
implement the R-ARCSS 2018 and bring peace to South Sudan. The goal of the chapter is 
to determine whether the political and security elites have deliberately frustrated the ending 
of the civil war in South Sudan despite signing the R-ARCSS 2018. The chapter is divided 
into two sections and the conclusion. The first section presents the summary of the R-
ARCSS 2018. The second section determines the role of the security and political elites in 
the failed implementation of the R-ARCSS 2018.  
A. BACKGROUND 
It took 15 months for the HLRF to come up with the R-ARCSS 2018, which was 
signed in Addis Ababa Ethiopia, on September 12, 2018.141  During the 15 months before 
the signing of the R-ARCSS 2018, five other agreements were signed. Clayton Hazvinei 
Vhumbunu lists these agreements as follows: 
• Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of Civilians and 
Humanitarian Access, December 21, 2017, in Addis Ababa-Ethiopia 
• Addendum to the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities, Protection of 
Civilians and Humanitarian Access, May 22, 2018, in Addis Ababa-
Ethiopia 
• Khartoum Declaration of Agreement between Parties to the Conflict in 
South Sudan, June 27, 2018, in Khartoum-Sudan 
• Agreement on Outstanding Issues of Security Agreements, July 6, 2018, in 
Khartoum-Sudan 
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• Agreement on Outstanding Issues on Governance, August 5, 2018, in 
Khartoum-Sudan142 
Unlike the ARCSS 2015, where the two main factions signed at different dates, this 
time they signed on the same day and at the same venue; President Salva Kiir signed on 
behalf of the TGoNU while  Riek Machar signed on behalf of the SPLM-IO. The R-ARCSS 
2018 was to repeal the ARCSS 2015 entirely.143 This section of the chapter presents a 
summary of the R-ARCSS 2018, covering the signatories, composition of the RTGoNU, 
security arrangements, monitoring of the implementation of the agreement, and 
reconciliation. 
1. The Signatories 
The signatories represented five categories that included the parties, stakeholders, 
guarantors, the IGAD mediation team, and international partners, shown in Tables 4 
through 6.144 
Table 4. The Parties: Signatories for Political Parties145 
Political Party Signatory 
TGoNU H.E. Salva Kiir 
SPLM-IO H.E. Riek Machar 
SPLM-FDsSouth Sudan Opposition 
Alliance (SSOA) 
Deng Alor Kuol 
                                                 
142 Clayton H. Vhumbunu, “Reviving Peace in South Sudan through the Revitalised Peace 
Agreement,” ACCORD, 4, accessed June 28, 2019, https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/reviving-
peace-in-south-sudan-through-the-revitalised-peace-agreement/. 
143 “Summary of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan” (Joint 
Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, September 12, 2018), https://www.jmecsouthsudan.com/
index.php/arcss-2015/agreement-summary/130. 
144 IGAD, “R-ARCSS 2018,” 1–5. 
145 Adapted from “Summary of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South 
Sudan,” 1–5. 
46 
Political Party Signatory 
Umbrella Coalition of Political Parties 
(UCPP) 
Peter Mayen Majongdit 
National Alliance of Political Parties 
(NAPP) 
Kornelio Kon Ngu 
United Sudan African Party (USAF) Ustaz Joseph Abong 
United Democratic Salvation Front 
(UDSF) 
Martin Toko Moyi 
United Democratic Party (UDP) Sterwart Sorobo Budia 
African National Congress (ANC) Wilson Lionding Sabit 
 
Table 5. The Organizations: Signatories for Organizations146 
Organization Signatory 
Faith Based organizations Bishop Enock Tombe and Shiek Mohamed 
Hassan 
Eminent persons Professor Moses Maca 
Women representative Mrs. Amer Manyok Deng 
Youth Dr. Koiti Emily 
Civil Society Organizations Hon Alokir Malual Aguer 
Business Community Mr. Simon Akuei Deng 
Academia Professor Pauline Elaine Riak 
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Table 6. The Guarantors: IGAD Heads of States Signatories147 
Country Head of State 
Ethiopia H. E Abiy Ahmed 
Djibouti H. E Ismail O. Guelleh 
Kenya H. E Uhuru Kenyata 
Somalia H. E Mohamed Abdullahi 
Sudan H. E Omar Bashir 
Uganda H. E Yoweri Museveni 
Rwanda H. E Paul Kagame 
 
The African Union High Level Ad-hoc Committee for South Sudan and African 
Union Commission was represented as well as officials from Algeria, Chad, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, South Africa, and the chairperson of the African Union Commission. 
a. IGAD Mediation  
• H.E. Amb. Dr Ismail Wais 
• H.E. George Chikoti 
• H.E. Ramatane Lamamra 
• H.E. Hanna Tetteh 
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b. International Partners 
Representatives from China, Norway, the UK, United States, UN, EU, and the 
IGAD Partners Forum also signed. 
The presence of many party signatories indicated an expanded inclusivity; 
however, there were individual members within these parties who belonged to more than 
one party, such as members belonging to SPLM-FD as well as belonging to TGoNU,148 
which later affected the implementation of the agreement. 
2. Composition of the RTGoNU, the Legislature, and the Judiciary 
The RTGoNU, whose mandate included implementing the accord, restoring peace 
and stability, and overseeing national reconciliation, among other tasks, was to be 
composed of TGoNU (the SPLM-IG and the SPLM-IO of Gen. Taban Gai), the SPLM-IO 
of Dr. Riek Machar, SSOA, SPLM-FDs, and other parties that were signatories to the 
accord.149 There was to be a pre-transition period of eight months commencing at the 
signing of the agreement and ending in May 2019, followed by a transitional period of 
three and half years. President Salva Kiir from the TGoNU was to remain the president, 
and Dr. Riek Machar from SPLM-IO was to be the first vice president. Two vice presidents 
were to be nominated by TGoNU, one by SPLM-FD, and one nominated by SSOA. One 
of the vice presidents had to be female, in addition to 35 percent of the executive being 
female.150 According to the R-ARCSS 2018, there shall be a 35-member council of 
ministers, whose roles will include implementing the accord in line with their ministries. 
The composition of the council of ministers from the different parties would be the TGoNU 
having 20 ministries; SPLM-IO, nine ministries; SSOA, two ministries; and the OPP 
having one ministry. 
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The legislature—the Transitional National Legislative Assembly (TNLA)—was to 
have 500 members, 332 members from TGoNU, 128 members from SPLM-IO, 50 
members from the SSOA, 30 members from OPP, and ten members from SPLM-FDs. The 
TNLA was to have a speaker nominated by TGoNU and three deputies.151 
At the state and local government level, governance was to be shared according to 
the following ratios: 55 percent by the TGoNU, 27 percent by the SPLM-IO, 10 percent by 
SSOA, and 8 percent by OPP. 
A Judicial Reform Commission would be established by RTGoNU, and it would 
be headed by an independent jurist. Composition of the commission be five members from 
the TGoNU, two from the SPLM-IO, two from SSOA, 1 from SPLM-FD, 1 from OPP, and 
2 IGAD representatives.152 
3. Security Arrangements 
A permanent ceasefire was to come into effect on 1 July 2018. All warring factions 
would be committed to the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) signed in 
Khartoum, Sudan in December 2017.153 After the permanent ceasefire came into effect, 
all parties had to ensure that all non-South Sudan armed groups leave the country. Warring 
factions had to vacate all areas occupied by civilians. Warring factions were to facilitate 
the provision of humanitarian assistance to civilians by the various agencies and UNMISS, 
and refrain from any recruitment or use of child soldiers. Disengagement and separation of 
warring factions, and cantonment of forces, was to be done 30 days after signing the 
agreement. Location of forces, size, and weaponry were to be declared to the Joint Military 
Ceasefire Commission (JMCC). Before the unification of forces, each head of the faction 
would be the commander in chief of that force. A Regional Protection Force, whose 
membership was to be agreed on by IGAD, was to be deployed alongside UNMISS.154 
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The time frame of eight months for the pre-transition period in which most of the 
security arrangements were to be carried out was five months longer than what was 
allocated in the ARCSS 2015. Nevertheless, with the deeply divided warring factions in 
the civil war, was eight months long enough? What have other countries with a similar 
situation done? Though not allocating an indefinite time, security arrangements are critical 
if an accord is to be a success, as other provisions will depend on them. 
4. Monitoring Mechanism of the R-ARCSS 2018 
A Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC) was 
formed to monitor the implementation of the agreement in addition to overseeing the 
mandate of the RTgoNU. Serious violations of the accord by the factions were to be 
reported to the RTGoNU. RJMEC was to be chaired by a prominent African and its 
composition was as follows155: 
 
1) Parties signatories to the accord: 
• Five members from TGoNU 
• Two members from SPLM-IO 
• One member from SSOA 
• One member from SPLM-FD 
• One member from Other Political Parties 
2) Other stakeholders  
• Two members from the faith-based organizations 
• Two women representatives 
• Two members of the Civil Service Organizations  
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• Two eminent persons 
• Two members from the business community 
• One from academia 
• Two youth representatives 
3) Regional guarantors that included Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, 
Uganda, IGAD secretariat, African Union Commission, and the AU-HLAHC 
each sent a representative. 
4) International partners that included China, Norway, the UK, United States, 
UN, EU, and the IGAD Partners Forum each sent a representative. 
Other areas of importance in the R-ARCSS 2018 include formation of a Hybrid Court of 
South Sudan to handle cases of violation of the international law. The Compensation and 
Reparation Authority was to be established to handle issues regarding people who had lost 
property during the civil war. The RTGoNU was to establish the Commission for Truth, 
Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH), which was to help in reconciling of the people of 
South Sudan divided by the war.156 
Since the signing of the R-ARCSS in September 2018, almost no deadline has been 
met as regards the implementation of the accord. Various highly regarded figures, 
including the Pope,157 have intervened and held talks with the political and security elites 
so as to implement the agreement and enable South Sudan to have peace but with little 
success. 
The next section of the chapter presents the role of the political and security elites 
in the failure to implement the R-ARCSS 2018 and bring peace to South Sudan. 
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B. THE ROLE OF THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY ELITES IN THE 
FAILURE OF THE R-ARCSS 2018 
The R-ARCSS 2018 was signed on September 12, 2018, but the course of its 
implementation had some critical deadlines. Some of the critical deadlines included eight 
months of pre-transition (that is, the RTGoNU would start its mandate eight months after 
the parties signing); a 60-day period for the Technical Boundary Committee to make a 
report about tribal and state boundaries for IGAD; deployment of a Regional Protection 
Force during the pre-transition period; declaring of location of forces of warring factions 
and formation of a Joint Transitional Security Council; and demilitarization of civilian 
areas, among others. However, the deadlines have not been met. This section of the chapter 
examines the role of the political and security elites in the failure to implement the R-
ARCSS 2018, by looking at the negotiations of the accord and the accord’s content.  
1. Negotiations of the R-ARCSS 2018  
Limited inclusivity during negotiations created spoilers who have formed new rebel 
and political parties and are making the implementation of the agreement difficult. 
Inclusivity, which involves all stakeholders negotiating fully, not just sitting in as 
observers, can prevent the emergence of spoilers who derail peace agreement 
implementation. In the case of R-ARCSS 2018, although the mediators tried to increase 
the number of stakeholders, negotiations mainly centered on the two main warring 
factionsthat is, the TGoNU and the SPLM-IO. For instance, in some sessions other 
parties were locked out of the negotiations as happened in Uganda: “At times during the 
talks, Bashir, Kiir, Machar, and Museveni reportedly were the only people in the room, 
prompting protests from the Opposition Alliance and other groups.”158 The practice of 
partially including parties in the negotiations contributed in part to people like Gen. 
Thomas Cirillo, one of the negotiators in the Opposition Alliance, to break ranks and form 
the National Salvation Front rebel group currently fighting in the equatorial province.159 
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In another instance, IGAD declined adding Paul Malong’s South Sudan United Front, 
arguing that Malong was under security council sanctions.160 The limited inclusion of 
stakeholders at the negotiations has led to the opposition of the outcome by some members 
of the elite and has contributed to the difficulties in implementing the accord. 
The centering of the negotiations around Kiir and Machar has resulted in the accord 
getting little support from international partners such as the Troika (the United States, UK, 
and Norway), who helped facilitate the CPA 2005 but also are key in financing the ARCSS 
2015 mediation and implementation, and civil society. The little support from the 
international partners and the civil society has affected the implementation of the 
agreement. At times, the Troika, EU, and CSOs often did not know what was going on 
during the negotiations,161 as they were always briefed after decisions were made by Kiir, 
Machar, and a few mediators. It is along these lines that the Troika stated, “we are 
concerned that the arrangements agreed to date are not realistic or sustainable. The best 
hope for sustainable peace is a process inclusive of ordinary men and women, civil society, 
religious leaders, ethnic minorities, and other excluded groups.”162  
Mistrust among the political and security elites in South Sudan during and after the 
negotiations is another reason why the R-ARCSS 2018 has not been implemented. For a 
peace accord to succeed requires faith among its negotiators; confidence must be built 
among the warring factions. Actions like freeing prisoners of war or political prisoners, 
stopping activities that act as conflict drivers, or even making public statements about 
commitment to the negotiations help build faith.163 But in the case of South Sudan, 
Machar, the leader of the biggest warring faction, was under house arrest in South Africa, 
and then moved to Khartoum, Sudan,164 while Kiir still held various political prisoners in 
Juba. Kiir’s mistrust and dislike for Machar remained evident during negotiations as he 
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said that Machar’s return to Juba would be only as a private citizen and he would not work 
with him.165 According to Vhumbunu, “since the outbreak of the second civil war in 
December 2013, Kiir has, on several occasions, declared his unwillingness and unreadiness 
to work with Machar, citing the latter’s intransigence.”166 On the other hand, if he was to 
proceed with the negotiations, Machar demanded the dismissal from government of Taban 
Gai, current vice president in the TGoNU and commander of Sudan People’s liberation 
Movement-In Oppisition-Taban Deng (SPLM-IO(TD), another rebel group.167 Taban Gai 
who is designated to be one of the vice presidents, has not yet been dismissed, and only a 
few political prisoners have been released by Kiir.168 Therefore, though the R-ARCSS 
2018 was signed, the mistrust that is still present among the warring factions is making its 
implementation difficult.  
The shortcomings of the negotiations of the R-ARCSS 2018, including limited 
inclusivity and continued mistrust among the parties that participated in the negotiations, 
have made implementation of the agreement difficult. Yet, it is not only the shortcomings 
of the negotiations but also the content of the accord that are rendering the implementation 
of the agreement difficult. Moreover, shortfalls in the content of the accord are being 
exploited by the elites. The next section looks at the content of the agreement. 
2. The Content of the R-ARCSS 2018 
“The content of agreements affects the durability of peace,”169 notes Fortna. The 
R-ARCSS 2018 contains various provisions that have an impact on the conflict in South 
Sudan; among them are the security arrangements, most of which had to be carried out 
during the pre-transition period, and the power-sharing deal. This section examines how 
the political and security elites have exploited the weaknesses in the security arrangements 
and power-sharing deal to make the implementation of the R-ARCSS 2018 difficult.  
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The security arrangements proposed in the agreement, which were to be handled in 
the pre-transition period, include demilitarization of areas occupied by civilians, cessation 
of hostilities, and cantonment of forces. Formation of a unified force under one command 
necessitated the restructuring of a national army, separation and stating location of forces 
for the warring factions, and disarmament and demobilization. Transitional security 
arrangements are critical not only for the implementation of an accord but also for other 
institutional developments within a post-civil war country.170  
Demilitarization of areas occupied by civilians and especially the urban areas of 
Juba and other state capitals has not been carried out, which has made implementation of 
the agreement difficult. As Fortna notes, “demilitarized zones can serve as physical 
constraints, making attack, particularly surprise attack, more difficult.”171 She further adds 
that, possession being “nine-tenths of the law,” troops’ withdrawal can have important 
territorial implications. Demilitarization has not been done as stipulated in the agreement, 
thus forfeiting any of the benefits that come with it. Because Salva Kiir’s troops presently 
hold most of the urban centers in the country and other areas occupied by the civilians, he 
is reluctant to order his troops to withdraw from these areas as it implies ceding or sharing 
territory with the rival factions.172 On the other hand, Machar is adamant to return to Juba, 
even with the invitation of Kiir after their return from Vatican,173 because Kiir’s forces are 
still deployed in Juba, and these are the same forces that forced him into exile in July 
2016.174 Noncompliance with the security arrangements by Salva Kiir has led Machar to 
request a six-month extension of the pre-transition period.175 Yet, Machar is focusing on 
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demilitarizing Juba and not talking about demilitarizing areas occupied by his forces, such 
as in Bentui, Unity state.176  
Similarly, the faction leaders’ refusal to demilitarize civilian areas affects other 
aspects of the peace deal, including the humanitarian aid. This aspect includes people 
returning to their homes from Internally Displaced Persons camps and relief agencies 
accessing those people. As reported by Jacob Ruai of UNMISS, “civilians seeking shelter 
at the UN protection site in Bentui are demanding that parties to the revitalized peace 
agreement demilitarize civilians’ centers across the Unity region to allow them to return to 
their homes.”177 The civilians are not returning to their home areas because the areas are 
still occupied by the forces of different factions, and such occupation is a sign of insecurity 
to the civilians. 
Cessation of hostilities as per the Khartoum declaration of December 2017 never 
occurred as fighting has gone on, especially in the equatorial region where government 
forces are fighting the National Salvation Front. “Cease-fire agreements can facilitate 
cooperation in several ways: by making it costly to attack, by reducing uncertainty about 
the other side’s actions and intentions and by preventing misunderstandings and accidents 
spiraling back into war,”178 Fortna observes. The observation is true if parties do respect 
the agreement; however, it is not the case with the conflict in South Sudan, which is full of 
spoilers.179 The NAS, led by Gen. Thomas Cirillo and the People’s Democratic Movement 
refused to sign the agreement, and some members of South Sudan Opposition Alliance 
(SSOA) claimed intimidation of their people by the Sudan government to sign the 
agreement.180 Consequently, they decided not to respect the cessation of hostilities and 
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continued to fight. But even those who signed the agreement and did not claim intimidation 
have violated the ceasefire agreement, as noted in the UN Report of the Commission of 
Human Rights in South Sudan, “Permanent ceasefire has since been reportedly violated by 
the parties including in Unity state, Western and Central Equatoria and Western Bahr el 
Ghazal states.”181 The areas mentioned in the human rights report are mainly contested by 
the main warring factions. Members of the security elite such as Gen. Cirillo of the National 
Salvation Front have taken advantage of the fighting to capture more territory, which 
increases their bargaining power in the case of negotiations and other advantages that come 
with it.  
The cantonment of forces, disarmament, and demobilization of forces in order to 
facilitate the formation of a unified force under one command have not been accomplished, 
which has also affected the implementation of the R-ARCSS 2018. According to Stedman, 
“the ending of civil wars hinges on the willingness of competing armies to relinquish self-
help solutions to their insecurity, to demobilize their soldiers, and in most circumstances, 
to create a new, integrated army.”182 He further adds that “these are processes, however, 
that are fraught with risks and antagonists.”183 Because of the mistrust and insecurity 
among elites, the cantonment of forces is viewed as losing territory currently occupied by 
their forces, while demobilizing is also looked at by the commanders as losing manpower, 
which might affect them if full-blown war breaks out, hence their reluctance to carry out 
cantonment and demobilization. Whereas Kiir has not cantoned his forces, the opposition 
commanders plan to prolong the cantonment period in order to carry on further recruitment 
so as to fill their quarters as stipulated in the agreement. Kiir also has stepped up 
recruitment in the former Warrap state.184 Kiir is opposed to the formation of a new 
military force; instead, he prefers other forces being integrated within the SPLA, which 
leaves him in control of the security apparatus. Nonetheless, the idea is opposed by other 
parties of the R-ARCSS 2018. Therefore, such differences among and actions by the elites 
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have affected meeting the deadline of the security arrangements of the R-ARCSS 2018, 
making its implementation difficult.  
The power-sharing deal of the R-ARCSS 2018 under the RTGoNU gives the 
presidency to Salva Kiir, deputized by five vice presidents. Dr. Riek Machar is the first 
vice president. Of the other four vice presidents two are to be nominated by RTGoNU, one 
by SSOA, and one by SPLM-FD. As noted previously, one of the four vice presidents must 
be a woman. Kiir has complained about the power-sharing deal as making his country an 
experiment of sorts, since nowhere in the world has a country had five vice presidents.185 
Further, power-sharing is to occur at the cabinet level among the 35 cabinet posts, within 
the legislature and at the state level. The power-sharing arrangement in R-ARCSS 2018, 
however, is opposed by some personalities in the warring factions, which is affecting the 
implementation of the agreement. According to Susan Stigant, the United States Institute 
of Peace director for the African program,  
power-sharing governments are most likely to succeed when they meet four 
conditions. First, there must be trust, commitment and willingness among 
the principal political leaders to work together. Political elites must be 
willing to work together. Second, decisions by the unity government should 
be kept to essentials. Third, both informal and formal dispute resolution 
mechanisms should be established and empowered to address the disputes 
that arise during the implementation period. Fourth, a robust and transparent 
mechanism should exist to monitor progress in the government’s clearly 
defined tasks.186 
Stigant’s first condition of trust, commitment, and willingness of the political leaders is 
critical to the success of the other three conditions. This first condition, however, is lacking 
in the case of South Sudan; for instance, Kiir has not given any evidence of his trust and 
willingness to work together with Machar. Instead, he has appointed Machar’s “rival,,” 
Taban Gai as the second vice president, which Machar opposes. Along the lines of trust, 
the reluctance of members holding multi-party membership is another sign of lack of good 
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faith and commitment to the accord. The lack of that critical condition has made other 
conditions mentioned by Stigant unattainable in the power-sharing deal. 
“Power-sharing has to be a more than zero-sum game, and more than a license to 
divide the spoils of the state,”187 notes Aly Verjee, a former advisor to IGAD. The proposal 
of five vice presidents in the RTGoNU was meant to accommodate the different parties at 
the executive but even within the parties, such as the SSOA, each one of them wants the 
post of the vice president. The SSOA, whose members David Deng claims, “have little in 
common beyond their opposition to government,”188 was given one vice presidential slot 
but because of internal division, as reported by the Joint Monitoring Team each member 
wants to take up the post. The infighting within SSOA is likely to cause spoilers as 
happened when Gen. Thomas Cilliro rejected the Khartoum declaration. SPLM-FD 
members such as John Luk Jok and Madut Biar belong to TGoNU,189 yet they also want 
to take up responsibility under SPLM-FD as per the R-ARCSS 2018 accord. Therefore, the 
actions of the elite have not only created divisions within the parties, but this division is 
affecting the implementation of the peace agreement. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The deadline for the pre-transition period was extended for six months and took 
effect from May 2019. Yet, exclusivity during the negotiations, which created spoilers, 
continues to haunt the South Sudan peace deal, as fighting continues in the Equatoria 
region. Mistrust among the stakeholders, most especially between Kiir and Machar, has 
not decreased as each continues to outdo the other in the promotion of personal interests. 
The security arrangements that were agreed upon that include the military leaving civilian 
occupied areas, cantonment of forces, demobilization, and disarmament, have not been 
acted upon by the leaders of the different warring factions because of personal interests. 
Recruitment, as well as arming, of forces by all factions is still going on. The power-sharing 
deal in the accord is affected not only by the mistrust between Kiir and Machar, but also 
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the infighting in other parties such as SPLM-FD and SSOA as the elite in these parties seek 
to occupy the allocated posts in RTGoNU. Further, the elites of these parties have multiple 
memberships; for instance, a member belonging to the SPLM-FD is also a minister in the 
TGoNU. Multiple memberships high lights the aspect of satisfying personal interests 
instead of promoting peace. Therefore, even with the extended period, unless the political 
and security elites change their attitude to approaching peace by abandoning the pursuit of 




IV. COMPARISON OF THE ARCSS 2015 AND R-ARCSS 2018 
AND THEIR OUTCOMES 
The IGAD in partnership with the international community has mediated between 
the warring factions in South Sudan since the civil war broke out in December 2013 
Nevertheless, neither has succeeded in bringing the civil war to an end as the political and 
security elites’ actions have continued to undermine the success of the accords. The first 
section of this chapter compares the two peace accords and the second section presents a 
conclusion. Each of the agreements was challenged by inclusivity thus creating spoilers in 
the end, mistrust and sincerity lacked in both agreements during the negotiations, in 
addition to stakeholders not implementing the security arrangements as stipulated in both 
agreements. Important also to note was the change in the guarantors of the agreements. 
Hence, comparison of the two peace accords is based on the negotiations, the content of 
the peace agreements, and international intervention. 
A. NEGOTIATIONS 
Negotiations are critical to the durability of any peace accord. Negotiations are also 
an important part of the peace processes, often marking the beginning of the process, and 
this activity must continue during the implementation stage of the accord. Some key factors 
enabling negotiations to succeed are inclusivity and trust among all the stakeholders. IGAD 
and other international partners were the lead negotiators in the South Sudan civil war. Yet, 
the civil war has not ended, as members of the elites have exploited loopholes in the 
accords. This section of the chapter compares the negotiations surrounding the two accords, 
based on inclusivity and the trust and good faith of the stakeholders. 
The ARCSS 2015 negotiations centered on Kiir and Machar, IGAD, under the 
influence of Kiir and Machar, was slow at including other stakeholders during the first 
phase of the negotiations. Although the SPLM-FD and civil society organizations were 
eventually included in the negotiations, it was not enough to stop or control the number of 
spoilers. Concentrating the talks around the two leaders led to other elites forming rebel 
and political groups to compete for power against Kiir and Machar. Dr. Lam Akol formed 
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the National Democratic Movement, Joseph Bangasi Bakosoro formed South Sudan 
Movement for Change, and Gen. Thomas Cirillo formed the National Salvation Front. The 
newly formed groups undermined the legitimacy of the ARCSS 2015 by fighting and 
opposing the TGoNU, contributing to the collapse of the agreement.  
By contrast, the R-ARCSS 2018 saw an increase in the number of stakeholders by 
including other groups that were left out during the ARCSS 2015 negotiations. The SSOA 
encompasses parties such as the South Sudan Movement for Change, National Salvation 
Front, and National Democratic Movement, while other parties including the African 
National Congress, United Democratic Party, United Democratic Salvation Front, United 
Sudan African Party, National Alliance of Political Parties, and Umbrella Coalition of 
Political Parties were separately represented. The larger representation resulted in 
increasing the executive to five vice presidents as compared to the two of the ARCSS and 
more sharing of other positions within the government by the elite. Disagreements arose, 
however, especially among the members of the SSOA, including Gen. Cirillo who did not 
sign the agreement. In addition, depending on where the negotiations took place, other 
stakeholders were left out of the negotiations; for instance, in Uganda negotiations were 
held only among Bashir, Museveni, Kiir, and Machar. The civil society organizations and 
the Troika did not fully engage in the negotiations.  
Nonetheless, the increased number of stakeholders included in the R-ARCSS 2018 
negotiations reduced the number of spoilers. However, increasing the number of 
stakeholders brought an increase in the size of the executive, all in the name of 
accommodating the interests of the many. Mistrust among the elites during negotiation of 
the ARCSS 2015 was mainly between Kiir and Machar, which affected the implementation 
of the accord. The mistrust between the two leaders dates back to the two-decade civil war 
with Sudan and has continued to the outbreak of the current civil war in December 2013. 
During negotiations, little was done by both sides to decrease the mistrust and the two 
continued to exhibit this attitude as shown in their rhetoric, the broken ceasefires, and the 
non-compliance to the security arrangements. Kiir’s forces attacked Machar’s forces in 
July 2016, forcing him to flee Juba; this led to the eventual collapse of the ARCSS 2015 
itself.  
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During the negotiations leading to the R-ARCSS 2018, mistrust and disloyalty 
persisted, not only between Machar and Kiir but also among the many more stakeholders 
who were included in the process. Thus, in the process of addressing the inclusion problem 
there was an expanded trust problem. IGAD and the international partners again did little 
to create an atmosphere of trust as Machar, negotiated while under house arrest in Sudan. 
At the same time, Kiir was adamant to release various political prisoners held in Juba who 
were supposed to be part of the negotiations. On the other hand, Machar promised not to 
deal with Taban Gai, his former ally, who had replaced him as vice president when Machar 
fled Juba in July 2016. There was intraparty mistrust also; for instance, the SSOA had two 
factions, Gen. Thomas Cirilo’s faction and Gabreil Changson’s faction. The two factions 
accused each other of being moles for either Kiir or Machar. Therefore, in both the ARCSS 
2015 and the R-ARCSS 2018, mistrust among the elites was critical in the collapse of the 
agreements.  
Exclusiveness, mistrust, and faithlessness among the elite during the negotiations 
affected the implementation of the accords. Although there more stakeholders were 
included in the R-ARCSS 2018, some spoilers sprung up, but not as many as those during 
the ARCSS 2015 accord. Mistrust still existed even during the negotiations of the R-
ARCSS 2018, and the situation was not improved by the increase in stakeholders, as the 
added groups developed internal problems, which later affected the implementation of the 
agreements. 
B. CONTENT OF THE AGREEMENTS 
The content of an agreement affects its durability. The ARCSS 2015 and the R-
ARCSS 2018 contained many resolutions; however, including power-sharing, the security 
arrangements, and the peacekeeping and monitoring. Power-sharing in the ARCSS 2015 
accord created the TGoNU with a pretransition period of 90 days that retained Kiir as 
president with two vice presidents, Riek Machar being the first vice president. Power was 
shared at the executive level according to the following ratios: 53 percent for the SPLM-
IG, 33 percent for the SPLM-IO, 7 percent SPLM-FD, and 7 percent for other political 
parties. At the state level, the SPLM-IO appointed governors in the states of Unity and 
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Upper Nile, while the SPLM-IG appointed the governor of Jongolei. In the other remaining 
states, ratios were 85 percent for the SPLM-IG, and 15 percent for the SPLM-IO; other 
stakeholders were not included in the power-sharing at the state level. At the state level the 
situation was complicated by Kiir increasing the number of states from ten to 28, a move 
criticized by his opponents who claimed Kiir was simply rewarding his loyalists. The 
power-sharing level was opposed by different elites of South Sudan: Kiir looked at it as 
rewarding rebellion, and generals Gadet and Cirillo claimed it was not representative of 
the South Sudan people, hence breaking ranks with Machar’s SPLM-IO. 
The power-sharing deal of the R-ARCSS 2018 involved the creation of the 
Revitalized Transition Government of National Unity, retaining Kiir as president, Machar 
as vice president, and three other vice presidents to be nominated from other stakeholders. 
The RTGoNU was to come into effect after the eight months of the pre-transition period. 
The National Pre-Transitional Period Committee (NPTC) was to take charge of the country 
during the pretransition period. One of the significant changes was that the TGoNU, a 
product of ARCSS 2015, replaced the SPLM-IG. The new power-sharing ratios were as 
follows: 55 percent for TGoNU, 27 percent of  SPLM-IO, 10 percent SSOA, and 8 percent 
OPP. Apart from the vice presidential slot allocated to the SPLM-FD, at the local 
government level, they were not allocated any slot as per ratios. In addition, the number of 
states was still a controversial issue that was not discussed during the negotiations but was 
referred to the Technical Boundary Committee. Kiir was not supportive of the deal as he 
complained of it making his country an experiment: no country in the world has ever had 
five vice presidents. He looked at the arrangement as a reward to rebellion, not a way to 
end the civil war. The power-sharing was also affected by the fact that some members of 
the elite belonged to more than one party such as the Umbrella Coalition of Political Parties 
and the Umbrella Democratic Party. Multi-membership in different parties by the elites 
was meant to have different options. The increase in the vice presidential slots, the 
expansion of the executive, and the creation of other bodies showed that it was about 
division of the national ‘cake’ among the elites, rather than looking at national issues and 
other causes of the conflict, which could further encourage rebellion. 
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As the number of stakeholders in the R-ARCSS 2018 increased, so did the power-
sharing arrangement to accommodate the new stakeholders. Nonetheless, the power-
sharing deal has not been fully supported by Kiir and other stakeholders. Excluding parties 
at the local level creates more spoilers, as only few members of the parties will be 
accommodated at the executive and cabinet level. The little support for the power-sharing 
situation presents two scenarios: 1) creation of spoilers from intra-party rivalries and 2) 
other elites considering rebellion a reward due to the expanded power-sharing scheme. But 
these scenarios can only succeed if the biggest stakeholders especially the TGoNU and the 
SPLM-IO are not united or if JMEC is weak at implementing the remedies for such 
situations. 
The ARCSS 2015 expanded the legislature, which it named the Transitional 
National Legislative Assembly (TNLA), from 332 members to 400 members. The increase 
in numbers was to be shared among the SPLM-IO, SPLM-FD, and other political parties. 
The R-ARCSS 2018 established the Revitalized Transitional National Legislative 
Assembly (RTNLA), expanded it from 400 members to 500 members: 332 for the TGoNU, 
128 for the SPLM-IO, 50 for SSOA, ten for SPLM-FD, and 30 for the OPP. The speaker, 
who was to be nominated by the TGoNU, was to work with three deputies nominated by 
the opposition. The choice of deputies from other opposition parties became a contested 
issue as each party wanted to nominate a person to the post, which again exhibited the 
elites’ wish to satisfy their interests.  
The difference between the TNLA of ARCSS 2015 and the RTNLA of the R-
ARCSS 2018 is the increased number of members and the structure of the leadership of 
the legislature. One of the problems of implementation, however, especially for the R-
ARCSS 2018 is who will be appointed to the assembly and under which party, given the 
fact that some elites belong to more than one party. The RTGoNU still has a larger 
percentage in the assembly, which gives it leeway in the decision-making process, given 
that the rule of the majority supporting a policy will turn it into law.  
The ARCSS 2015 accord was tasked to establish a judicial arm that is independent 
of the executive. The TGoNU was to establish a Hybrid Court of South Sudan to try cases 
of genocide, war crimes, and gross human rights abuses; the Commission for Truth, 
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Reconciliation, and Healing was tasked with reconciliation of the nation; and the 
Compensation and Reparation Authority to handle compensation of those who lost 
property during the conflict. All the judicial bodies were aimed at bringing justice to the 
people of South Sudan.  
The R-ARCSS 2018 accord states that the RTGoNU was to establish a Hybrid 
Court of South Sudan, the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation, and Healing, and the 
Compensation and Reparation Authority, all bodies tasked with bringing justice and 
accountability to South Sudan. The R-ARCSS 2018 accord also mandated the RTGoNU to 
establish a Judicial Reform Commission). Apart from the establishment of the commission 
in the R-ARCSS 2018, the terms and references of these bodies are the same as that of 
ARCSS 2015. 
The two peace agreements created the same kind of bodies to administer justice in 
South Sudan and RARCSS 2018 speaks little of the constitutional review, IGAD and the 
African Union Commission were given considerable powers in these bodies; however, the 
RTGoNU had a big stake in the final decisions of the bodies. A number of high-level 
security officers including Gen. Paul Malong, Gen. James Koang of SPLA-IO, Gen. Simon 
Gatwech of SPLA-IO, and Gen. Chaung of the presidential guard, among others, are under 
UN sanctions, and yet they are expected to play a crucial role in the implementation of the 
accords. The proposed judicial bodies mandate, however, is silent about the issue. Not 
prosecuting anyone might lead to further conflict, as it might lead to impunity on the part 
of leaders in the country.  
The security arrangements have remained essentially the same from the ARCSS 
2015 to the R-ARCSS 2018 agreements. These arrangements involve a permanent 
ceasefire and demilitarizing civilian occupied areas, especially the capital city of Juba and 
of state capitals. Leaders of the warring factions were to declare the location of their troops 
and their numbers, to disarm and demobilize militias, as well as carry out cantonment of 
the forces in order to facilitate the formation of a unified military force under a single 
command. The arrangements have not been implemented according to either agreement. 
The difference between the ARCSS 2015 and the R-ARCSS 2018 was that the 2015 
agreement involved only two warring factions. Due to the creation of spoilers in the 
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aftermath of its failure, however, the R-ARCSS 2018 had multiple signatories. Kiir’s force 
being in control of the bigger part of the country has made him neglect many of the 
provisions of the security arrangements of the R-ARCSS 2018. On the other hand, Machar 
has not declared the location of his forces, nor has he disarmed militias (such as the white 
army militia) that have been fighting alongside his forces. Gen. Cirillo’s National Salvation 
Front continues to fight in the Equatoria region, and although Gen. Gadet passed on in 
April 2019, his forces of the United Sudan Southern Movement/Army are still active in the 
civil war in the areas of south Kordafan. The other difference brought about by the R-
ARCSS 2018 is that the fighting is almost confined to the Equatoria region where the 
National Salvation Front forces are fighting the TGoNU.  
While the peacekeeping mission during the implementation of the ARCSS 2015 
was to be carried out by UNMISS, that mission was to be carried out by a Regional 
Protection Force in addition to UNMISS during the implementation of the R-ARCSS 2018. 
The membership of the Regional Protection Force was to be agreed on by IGAD members 
and signatories. Kiir protested the deployment of UNMISS for the peacekeeping mission 
of ARCSS 2015, claiming that they supported Machar’s SPLM-IO. Meanwhile, Machar 
protested the membership of Uganda in the Regional Protection Force during the R-
ARCSS 2018 implementation because Ugandan troops fought alongside Kiir’s forces 
during the civil war. Thus, when clashes broke out in July 2016, UNMISS did not intervene 
because it was not in their mandate. The mandate of UNMISS was changed for the R-
ARCSS 2018, however, and it can intervene should clashes break out. It is clear, then, that 
the actions of Machar and Kiir had effects on implementing the peace agreements. 
The Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism Commission was established to 
monitor the implementation of the ARCSS 2015 and oversee the tasks of the TGoNU, 
while the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission was established to 
monitor the implementation of the R-ARCSS 2018. Apart from the expanded composition 
of the R-ARCSS 2018 to include new stakeholders to the negotiations, the tasks of the two 
commissions were the same. Kiir was opposed to the JMEC of the ARCSS 2015, as he felt 
the commission was given too much power, especially the power to veto a decision even 
if a consensus had been reached in the TGoNU. He opposed the veto power because of the 
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superior numbers of his faction in the TGoNU, which needed only a few members from 
the opposition to have the required 67 percent for a decision to be taken. Subsequently, the 
RJMEC faced opposition, especially from areas where Kiir’s forces were in control.  
C. INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION 
IGAD was the main guarantor of the ARCSS 2015, while Sudan and Uganda are 
the main guarantors of the R-ARCSS 2018. The Troika, UN, and other international 
partners were more active during the ARCSS 2015 negotiations, when they threatened and 
imposed individual sanctions on some members of the warring factions, which encouraged 
leaders of the factions to sign the agreement. By contrast, the Troika and the international 
partners were less engaged in the negotiations of the R-ARCSS 2018 as Sudan and Uganda 
took the lead. The outcome of Sudan and Uganda leading the negotiations saw Sudan given 
the responsibility of securing some oil fields in South Sudan supported mainly by Machar, 
and Uganda getting wider responsibility on South Sudan’s southern border supported by 
Kiir. Kiir and Machar taking sides in support of different countries’ interests showed the 
influence of these countries on the two leaders. With the negotiations centered on the 
interests of the two neighboring countries and giving little attention to the Troika and other 
international partners, questions arose about the legitimacy of the outcome. Questions by 
the Troika and other international partners about the accord’s legitimacy have kept them 
from committing resources for the implementation of the agreement. 
Although there was an increase in the number of stakeholders in the R-ARCSS 
2018 negotiations as compared to the ARCSS 2015, some elites still felt unsatisfied with 
the outcome of the negotiations and decided to fight on. Mistrust and disloyalty among the 
leaders of the warring factions were still present during the R-ARCSS 2018 as Machar 
negotiated while under house arrest. There were also divisions within the opposition 
parties, such as in the SSOA, as the leaders could not find a common ground. As in the 
ARCSS 2015, the elements of the R-ARCSS 2018 addressing power-sharing, security 
arrangements, and the monitoring of the agreement are facing obstacles in implementation. 
Sudan and Uganda are the main guarantors of the R-ARCSS 2018 as IGAD was the main 
guarantor of the ARCSS 2015. But Sudan and Uganda have motivated the elite to support 
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protection of these countries’ interests in the agreement as a fallback in case the agreement 
does not hold.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The prolonged civil war in South Sudan, which began in 1983, ended with signing 
of the CPA in 2005. The long-awaited and fragile peace, however, was undone by rival 
elites, weak institutions, and a crippled economy. At independence in 2011, however, 
South Sudan was led by the SPLM, a party characterized by division, and a leader who 
often put his personal interests before those of the country. Through clientelism and 
patronage politics, the political and security elites made South Sudan vulnerable to both 
external and internal stress, including ethnic rivalries. In addition, South Sudan inherited 
the SPLA as the national army, which integrated which brought about even more disunity 
and lack of discipline within the force. 
In 2013, a series of disagreements among the elites within the SPLM, and a clash 
within the presidential guard between forces loyal to President Kiir and those of the 
dismissed vice president, triggered renewed violence. The regional IGAD and other 
international partners called for an end to the fighting through negotiations among the 
warring factions, which has since resulted in the signing of two peace agreements: the 
ARCSS 2015 and the R-ARCSS 2018. Yet, neither has been fully implemented as the elites 
of South Sudan exploited the weaknesses in the accords. 
Spoilers have sprung up as a result of limited inclusivity during the negotiations of 
the accords. Although there was an increase in the number of stakeholders to the R-ARCSS 
2018, the added delegations did not fully participate in the negotiations as the talks again 
centered on Kiir and Machar. Lack of political will and distrust among the elites of South 
Sudan has also affected the implementation of both accords. The power-sharing 
arrangement in the ARCSS 2015 was not supported by President Kiir, and there were 
disagreements about it in the SPLM-IO as generals Gadet and Cirillo broke ranks with 
Machar to form their own rebel groups. The R-ARCSS 2018 power-sharing deal expanded 
the number of vice presidents to five in order to accommodate more leaders; however, this 
position was also affected by rifts within the opposition as they have scrambled for the few 
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posts allocated to them. Furthermore, many members continue to belong to multiple 
parties. At the same time, there are still disagreements between Taban Gai and Machar and 
Machar claims he does not want to work in the same government as Taban Gai.  
Similarly, security arrangements in both agreements have not been implemented as 
ceasefire periods have been used to mobilize and recruit more troops. Demilitarization of 
urban and civilian occupied areas has not been carried out as leaders of the warring factions 
refused to cede territory. Disarmament and demobilization of militias, as stated in both 
agreements, is seen by the different factions as loss of manpower; hence, it has also been 
neglected. The elites have also taken advantage of the interests of neighboring countries 
Uganda and Sudan to frustrate the ending of the civil war in South Sudan. Ugandan troops 
fought alongside Kiir’s forces against Machar’s SPLM-IO. Machar has been supported by 
Sudan. Gen. Gadet and Gen. Cirillo received sanctuary in Khartoum when they broke ranks 
with Machar. Machar and Kiir supported Sudan and Uganda respectively during the R-
ARCSS 2018 as the two countries secured their interests in the agreement. 
Therefore, the political and security elites of South Sudan, having led the country 
to independence from the Republic of Sudan in 2011, have failed to guide it forward; civil 
war resumed in 2013 and persists to this day. Despite the intervention of IGAD and the 
international community through organizing negotiations and the eventual signing of peace 
agreements, resolving the conflict remains unlikely as long as political and security elites 
concentrate on protecting their personal interests rather than those of the country.  
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